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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0, as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court err in ruling that appellants' complaint 
failed to state a claim for breach of implied contractual duties? This issue was addressed 
below in connection with the defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119-135). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, % 9, 99 
P.3d842. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the district court err in ruling that appellants' complaint 
failed to state a tort cause of action against the defendants (including breach of 
confidentiality, breach of fiduciary duty, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligence)? This issue was addressed below in connection with the 
defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119-135). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ^  9, 99 
P.3d842. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the district court err in ruling that the complaint failed to 
state a cause of action because damages had not been sufficiently alleged? This issue was 
1 
addressed below in connection with defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119-
135). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's dismissal for failure to 
state a claim is reviewed de novo by the Court. A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss 
is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ^ 9, 99 P.3d 
842. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506(b): 
General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and 
for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, 
during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician 
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient, 
and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health 
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or 
members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the 
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction 
of the physician or mental health therapist. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d)(1): 
Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(d)(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant 
to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after 
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition 
as an element of the claim or defense;... 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, contract 
or assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an 
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
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obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an 
authorized agent of the provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4). Privileged communications. 
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a 
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege 
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which the patient places 
his medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his claim or defense. 
Under those circumstances, a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or 
treated that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide information, 
interviews, reports, records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the 
patient's medical condition and treatment which are placed at issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This action arose when a treating physician secretly agreed to serve as a paid witness 
for his former patient's adversary in underlying litigation, with the understanding that his 
cooperation would include a change to his original diagnosis. Nicholas Sorensen and his 
guardians Kevin and Pamela Sorensen (hereinafter collectively "Sorensen") filed this action 
on August 3, 2004, against defendants John P. Barbuto, individually, and John P. Barbuto, 
M.D., P.C. (hereinafter collectively "Barbuto") (R. 1). 
On August 31, 2004, Barbuto filed a motion to dismiss Sorensen's complaint on the 
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 13). After 
briefing and oral argument, the trial court dismissed the complaint, incorporating "all of the 
legal analyses and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda in support and reply.. . ." 
(R. 155). An Order was entered on May 17, 2005 (R. 158). Sorensen filed a notice of 
appeal on May 31, 2005. (R. 164). 
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Statement of Facts 
Sorensen's complaint included the following allegations: 
On July 24, 1999, Nicholas Sorensen was a passenger in a single-vehicle rollover 
accident on 1-15. Another passenger in the vehicle was killed and both Sorensen and the 
driver were seriously injured. Sorensen was treated by Barbuto for his head injuries and 
seizures for nearly a year and a half before Barbuto was removed by Sorensen's medical 
insurer from its list of approved providers, at which time, Sorensen began treating with 
other doctors. Barbuto's treatment of Sorensen included diagnostic tests and examinations, 
prescriptions for medicine, overseeing cognitive therapy, and other treatment for seizures 
and brain injury. (R. 2, ^ flf 5, 6). 
Being unable to reach a settlement with the driver's liability insurer, Sorensen filed a 
personal injury action entitled Nicholas Sorensen v. Jack W. Marcelis, et al, Civil No. 
00095711, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "personal injury 
action" or the "underlying action"). At the time the personal injury action was filed in 
2000, Barbuto was still Sorensen's treating physician. (R. 2, ^ flj 6-7). 
During the course of the personal injury action, Barbuto's medical records were 
produced. Neither party took Barbuto's deposition. The matter was set for trial in the latter 
part of May 2003. Two weeks before the trial date, opposing counsel in Sorensen's 
personal injury action subpoenaed Barbuto to appear and give testimony at trial. Shortly 
thereafter, the judge continued the trial until October 2003 for reasons not related to this 
matter. (R. 3, Iflf 8, 9). 
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Without notice to the Sorensens or their counsel, and without authorization by the 
Sorensens, Barbuto continued to engage in ex parte contact with opposing counsel in the 
personal injury action, with Barbuto agreeing to act as an expert witness against his former 
patient. (R.3,^9). 
On August 1, 2003, opposing counsel provided medical records and other 
information to Barbuto and asked him to give his opinions about "what has been going on 
with Mr. Sorensen since you last saw him," and to address "to what degree his current 
issues are as a result of the [brain] injury and what those issues might be as a result of 
problems Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident." The letter also requested that Barbuto 
contact counsel to discuss his opinions and several other issues that they would like him to 
address. (R. 40, ^  5). 
Pursuant to this ex parte request, Barbuto prepared an extensive 10-page report, 
dated August 11, 2003. After orally discussing his opinions with opposing counsel, Barbuto 
was instructed not to send the written report to counsel, an instruction which he obeyed. (R. 
40,16). 
After being retained by opposing counsel, Barbuto changed his original treating 
diagnosis of seizure disorders and began opining that Sorensen was not suffering from 
seizures after all; rather, his problems were in large part psychological and social in origin 
(a standard theme in nearly all of Barbuto's reports when hired by the defense). (R. 3-4, fflf 
10-12). 
Approximately two weeks before the October 2003 trial, the ex parte contacts 
between Barbuto and opposing counsel were discovered by chance during the deposition of 
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another witness to the case. Immediately thereafter, Sorensen's counsel met with Barbuto 
and scheduled his deposition for September 30, 2003. During such deposition, Sorensen's 
counsel learned for the first time that opposing counsel had retained Barbuto, that Barbuto 
had altered his treating opinions, and that counsel and Barbuto had agreed between 
themselves to withhold this information from Sorensen's counsel. An emergency motion in 
limine was filed, and the Hon. William B. Bohling excluded the testimony of Barbuto and 
his new opinions. (R. 4,^ 1 ll).1 
Barbuto is well-known in the legal community for his extreme defense biases and his 
close relationship with insurers and insurance defense counsel. Barbuto has made hundreds 
of thousands of dollars a year doing so-called independent medical examinations for the 
defense, rarely, if ever, doing any on behalf of a plaintiff. He has admitted performing 
approximately 200 IMEs per year, all for the defense, rendering the predictable opinion in 
nearly every case, if not all cases, that the plaintiffs pain and other problems primarily or 
completely have their origin in psychological and/or secondary gain. (R. 4, ^ f 12). 
Because the defense bar provides the vast majority of his income, Barbuto does not 
hesitate (as in this case) to change or spin his own treating medical opinions to favor the 
defense once a claim is made, all for the purpose of enhancing his own personal monetary 
1
 Barbuto represented in his reply memorandum below that the sole basis upon which 
Sorensen sought exclusion of Barbuto's testimony was that he was not designated timely 
as an expert. (R. 128 n. 2). That was incorrect. The court may take judicial notice of the 
actual court filing by Sorensen in the underlying case, a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit 3. The motion emphasized the violation of Sorensen's rights 
as a patient, breach of confidentiality, and other impropriety of Barbuto's conduct, apart 
from any timeliness issues. See id. 
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gain and to advance a strong philosophical opposition to the legal compensation system in 
America. (R.4,f 13). 
Barbuto's breach of duties caused Sorensen emotional distress, anguish and anxiety, 
and some financial loss. (R. 7, 9, fflf 19, 35). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is well established in the law, and was not contested below, that an implied 
contractual relationship exists between physicians and their patients. The trial court 
erroneously adopted Barbuto's argument, however, that no claim may be brought against 
a physician for breach of an implied contract unless the contract is in writing. (Indeed, 
the very notion that something implied must be in writing is counterintuitive.) 
By its terms, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 limits only those claims for breach of 
contract that are based upon an allegation that the physician promised or warranted a 
particular result. That and similar statutes were enacted in response to the peculiar 
evidentiary and related problems posed by that particular type of contract claim, problems 
that are not presented when a duty does not depend on contested testimony, but rather is 
implied as a matter of law. 
The appellee's argument that implied contractual duties of a physician would not 
include confidentiality of his patients' medical information is contrary to case law, the 
nature of the relationship, and the long-established expectations of patients, reflected in 
standards promulgated by the American Medical Association and Utah Medical 
Association, the Hippocratic Oath, and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
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In addition to contract-based claims, Sorenson's complaint supports various tort 
theories of liability. Utah law first recognized nearly fifty years ago that a doctor owes an 
actionable tort duty of confidentiality to his patients. That duty was breached here in at 
least three separate respects. 
First, the ex parte communications in which Barbuto engaged constitute a breach 
of confidentiality. A majority of jurisdictions now recognize that, even when a patient's 
medical condition is at issue in litigation, allowing unfettered access by opposing counsel 
to a treating physician does not provide any protections to the patient. Without 
supervision of the disclosure process, a patient has no opportunity to object to the 
relevance of questions asked or answers given, to clarify the scope of the medical 
condition actually at issue, or otherwise to evaluate or assert his patient-physician 
privilege. This Court recognized the need for such supervision and notice in Debry v. 
Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582, even when the patient's condition is at issue. 
In the court below, Barbuto argued that he could not have committed a breach of 
confidentiality because he did nothing more than review records that had previously been 
disclosed. One of the key allegations in Sorenson's complaint, however, was that 
Barbuto changed the diagnosis and indications in his own medical records, by definition 
producing "new" information. 
Finally, a breach of confidentiality arises when a physician discloses false or 
inaccurate medical information. The basic duty to preserve a patient's confidences 
includes the concept that, when utterances are made, they must be truthful. 
The allegations of the complaint also support a claim for breach of Barbuto's 
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fiduciary duties toward Sorenson. The law in Utah and elsewhere is that the physician-
patient relationship is fiduciary in nature. With the physician's fiduciary status comes 
several independent duties of which Sorenson's complaint alleges a breach, including the 
duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and refraining from taking advantage of client 
confidences. 
A separate claim for negligence arises if the fact finder believes Barbuto's claim 
that he sincerely changed his mind about his earlier diagnosis. As a fiduciary, Barbuto 
owed a duty to disclose subsequently acquired information that he knew would make 
untrue or misleading a previous representation. Barbuto also owed a duty to disclose 
information that a reasonable patient would consider material, which encompasses a 
reversal of his own longstanding diagnosis. 
Barbuto's alleged conduct also supports a claim for invasion of privacy. The only 
way for Sorenson to ameliorate the effect of Barbuto's improper conduct required that 
Barbuto's deposition, including its aspersions against Sorenson, be made a matter of 
public record. Additionally, the circumstances allow an inference that a sufficiently large 
number of people received Sorenson's private information, or that no minimum number 
of recipients was required because the disclosure was made in breach of a trust. 
The allegations of Sorenson's complaint, if believed by a fact finder, establish 
outrageous conduct sufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The complaint alleges, among other things, the breach of a patient's confidences 
and the reversal of a physician's original diagnosis in furtherance of the physician's 
personal agenda, both of which are reprehensible. 
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Sorenson's claim for negligence was not subject to dismissal on the ground that 
Barbuto's actions were intentional. Intentional disclosures can be negligently made, and 
both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that allegations of negligent 
and intentional conduct can co-exist on the "continuum" of culpability. 
Finally, the trial court erred in adopting Barbuto's argument that damages were not 
sufficiently pled. By definition, the general damages that flow naturally from a breach of 
trust cannot be pled with specificity. Additionally, the complaint alleges that Sorenson 
incurred economic loss, e.g., attorney fees and expense, as a result of Barbuto's breaches, 
which is all that is required in an initial pleading. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review of a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is "a severe remedy and should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be provided in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State 
Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court 
must construe the facts in the complaint liberally, and consider all reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Busche v. Salt 
Lake County, 2001 UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; Raymond v. Bonneville Billing & 
Collections, Inc., 04 UT 27, 89 P.3d 171. 
Under Utah's notice pleading requirements, most claims need not be pled with 
specificity in order to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion, so long as the complaint gives fair 
notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted, and a general indication of the type of 
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litigation involved. Busche, supra, citing Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 
403, 406 (Utah 1998); Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, ^ 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (even with respect 
to fraud claims that must be pled with specificity, "liberalized pleading rules" still apply, 
requiring nothing more than "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved"). 
Introduction 
In this case, a physician is alleged to have made unauthorized and/or false 
disclosures about a former patient's medical condition to an adverse party in litigation for 
the physician's personal gain. The trial court held that no cause of action can be 
maintained under Utah law for such alleged misconduct. That ruling, however, 
contradicts both Utah law and that of most other jurisdictions. 
As discussed below, most courts in the United States recognize a cause of action 
for alleged breach of confidentiality by a physician, typically based upon one or more of 
the following theories: 1) breach of implied contractual duties; 2) breach of 
confidentiality and/or fiduciary duties, and 3) invasion of privacy. In McCormick v. 
England, 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435-36 (1994), the court summarized the then-
emerging state of the law: 
The modern trend recognizes that the confidentiality of the physician-patient 
relationship is an interest worth protecting. A majority of the jurisdictions faced 
with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the 
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless the disclosure is 
compelled by law or is in the patient's interest or the public interest. . . . The 
jurisdictions that recognize the duty of confidentiality have relied on various 
theories for the cause of action, including invasion of privacy, breach of implied 
contract, medical malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of 
confidentiality. 
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Id. at 435-36; see also Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, "Physician's Tort Liability for 
Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient," 48 A.L.RAth 668 
(compiling cases); David A. Elder, Privacy Torts, § 5.2 ("the clear modem consensus of 
the case law has imposed a legal duty of confidentiality or a fiduciary duty" under 
physician-patient relationship); 3 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation (2d ed.), § 
25:8 (categorizing theories of liability against physician for unauthorized disclosures). 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAN BE ASSERTED AGAINST A 
PHYSICIAN UNLESS THE ALLEGED CONTRACT IS IN 
WRITING. 
Sorensen's first cause of action was for breach of implied contractual duties 
arising out of the physician-patient relationship. It is well established in the law that such 
duties exist between a physician and his patient. See, e .g., Leger v. Spurlock, 589 So.2d 
40, 42 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991); Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center, 448 N.W.2d 78, 
82 (Minn. App. 1989); MacDonald v. dinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 
(1982); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 
287 So.2d 824 (1973). 
In the court below, however, Barbuto successfully sought dismissal of Sorensen's 
contract claim on the ground that the implied-by-law contract between them was not in 
writing. Barbuto's principal argument was that all contract-based claims against doctors 
are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 unless the contract is in writing. The assertion 
of that argument, however, required a few well-placed ellipses. Without Barbuto's 
omissions, Section 78-14-6 reads, in its entirety: 
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78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an 
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an 
authorized agent of the provider. 
In his argument below, Barbuto, however, abbreviated the statutory text thus: 
No liability shall be imposed on any health care provider on the basis of an alleged 
breach of. . . contract . . . unless the . . . contract . . . is set forth in writing and 
signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider. 
(R. 18; ellipses in original). 
Eliminating all of the qualifying words, Barbuto argued that "Utah law precludes a 
contract claim against a physician absent a written contract signed by the physician or his 
designated agent." (R. 18.) The trial court adopted Barbuto's reasoning, even though, 
when read in full, the statute by its terms addresses only guarantees, warranties, contracts, 
or assurances "of result to be obtained from any health care rendered." 
The limited scope of the statute, pertaining to promises of a particular result, is not 
accidental. Rather, it stems from the history of this specific type of claim. "[TJhe courts 
have often said that in the absence of a special contract, a physician does not warrant the 
success of his treatment, nor even that beneficial results will occur . . . ." Jack W. Shaw, 
Jr., Annotation, "Recovery Against Physician on Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve 
Particular Result or Cure," 43 A.L.R.Sd 1221, § 2. See, e.g., Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Assoc, 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 (1970) ("The law does not impose 
13 
upon a physician or surgeon the duty of guaranteeing that his treatment will achieve good 
results"), and cases cited. 
Not surprisingly, given the stated exception, plaintiffs' attorneys began to allege 
the existence of a special contract by physician defendants to achieve particular results. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a plethora of opinions were issued involving such alleged 
contracts or warranties. See, e.g., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, §§ 3-6. The principal dispute in 
nearly all such cases was whether an agreement existed. Id., § 2 ("The problem, 
therefore, appears to be one of proof that such an agreement was or was not made.") The 
alleged promise was usually oral, posing endless 'he said-she said' evidentiary disputes 
and making it difficult for defendants to seek early resolution of the lawsuit. The problem 
was exacerbated by a blurring in some patients' minds between "therapeutic 
reassurances" ("you'll be all right") and actionable representations or promises of a 
particular result. See id., and id. § 2. 
To address this problem, states began to require that claims against health care 
providers based upon alleged contracts or warranties of a particular result be in writing. 
See, e.g., Edwards v. Germantown Hospital, 736 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 1999) 
(purpose of 1975 statute requiring written contract was to codify law that physician is 
neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of result); Zapata v. Rosenfeld, 811 S.W.2d 182 (Ct. 
App. - Houston, 1991) (applying Texas statute requiring written promise or warranty of 
particular result to enforce alleged promise). 
Consistent with other states, Utah adopted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 in 1976. 
The statutes accomplished their goal; very few cases claiming promised results have been 
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brought in the past two decades. See 43 A.L.RJd 1221, §§ 3-8. By their terms, however, 
the statutes apply only to claims of a contract (guarantee, warranty, or assurance) of a 
particular result, not other contracts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 
107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 347 S.E.2d 
743 (N.C. 1986) (statute providing that ,f[n]o action may be maintained against any health 
care provider upon any guarantee, warranty or assurance as to the result of any medical, 
surgical or diagnostic procedure or treatment unless . . . in writing and signed by the 
provider or by some other person authorized to act for or on behalf of such provider" did 
not apply to claim for breach of contract not involving promise to yield specific result). 
Other types of contract claims, ones which do not present the same unique 
problems of proof, simply do not fall within the statute's scope. In the case of an implied 
contractual duty to retain confidences, for example, the law implies the duty; therefore, it 
is immaterial whether the physician also made representations in that regard. The trial 
court erred in construing Section 78-14-6 as applying to all contract claims, regardless of 
the subject matter. 
The statute uses a string of similar words ("guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance") 
because a cause of action may differ depending on whether a physician's statement is 
characterized as a promise or a representation. "Technically, where the defendant has 
made a promise to the plaintiff concerning the forthcoming operation or procedure, the 
cause of action may properly be characterized as a contract action, whereas if the 
defendant has made some representation of fact concerning the result of the operation or 
procedure, the action would properly be one for breach of warranty." Daniel P. Kapsak, 
"Cause of Action Against Physician for Breach of Contract or Warranty," 22 Causes of 
Action 779 (2004), § 3. Section 78-14-6 covers all the bases. 
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Barbuto also argued below that, assuming the existence of an enforceable contract, 
the only implied duties that arose "would deal with the professional diagnosis and 
treatment of the patient's condition. Plaintiffs are not claiming Mr. Sorensen's failure to 
receive the 'fruits of the contract,' Dr. Barbuto's professional diagnosis and treatment." 
(R.19). 
That argument artificially narrows the scope of the implied contractual relationship 
between a physician and patient. The "fruits of the contract" inherently include the basic 
concept of confidentiality. In Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 85 N.Y.2d, 650 N.E.2d 401 (1995), a 
physician allegedly provided a false affidavit to an insurance company that was adverse to 
a patient with respect to a claim for benefits. New York's high court rejected an 
argument similar to Barbuto's, that the only duty owed to a patient was of competent 
medical treatment, not of confidentiality: 
The physician in this case would limit his duty to the provision of competent 
medical treatment to his patient. Defendant, however, has ignored the central 
thrust of this case and confused simple and ordinary medical malpractice with the 
distinct yet related duty, when required, of providing truthful information about the 
patient. Unassailably, part of a physician's duty to the patient, when authorized to 
supply otherwise confidential information to others—either as a result of a 
patient's express consent or waiver by the condition having been placed in issue— 
includes truthful utterances, particularly, as here, when delivered under oath and 
with awareness that a false statement will be relied upon the detriment of the 
patient. 
650 N.E.2d at 404; see also Elder, supra, § 5.2 (stating that a majority of courts have 
imposed actionable confidentiality requirement "as a 'special and peculiar fiduciary 
relationship' imposing an 'additional duty springing from, but extraneous to,' the 
contract"). 
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Implied contractual duties derive from the nature of the relationship and the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract. Machan v. Unum Life Insurance 
Company of America, 2005 UT 37, fflj 12, 16, 19 n. 2, 30, 116 P.3d 342. In defining 
those expectations, a court may consider external standards governing physicians' 
conduct. Id.9 *j\ 30 ("Even in the absence of a private right of action under [claims 
handling statute], we would deem it proper for a court to take into account the 
legislature's mandates, as well as the insurance commissioner's regulations, regarding 
insurance adjuster duties when making a determination of the parties' reasonable 
expectations under the contract"). 
In this case, apart from a lack of support in the case law, any argument that a 
physician's implied contractual duties do not include confidentiality is inconsistent with 
well-established standards of conduct that form part of a patient's reasonable 
expectations. All physicians, for example, are required to abide by the AMA Principles 
of Medical Ethics. (The Utah Medical Association has expressly adopted the AMA 
Principles. (R. 83-85).) Those standards require physicians to, among other things 
"respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals, [and] 
safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law." AMA E-Principles of 
Medical Ethics, Preamble, No. 4 (2002). 
The AMA Principles also provide that: 
The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship 
between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree. The 
patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of information to the physician in 
order that the physician may most effectively provide needed services. The patient 
should be able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will 
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respect the confidential nature of the communication. The physician should not 
reveal confidential communications or information without the express consent of 
the patient, unless required to do so by law. 
AMA E-Principles, E-5.05 (1994). 
A patient's expectation of confidentiality also "has its genesis in the Hippocratic 
Oath, which states in pertinent part: 'Whatever, in connection with my professional 
practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to 
be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.55' 
McCormick, 494 S.E.2d at 435, quoting Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 902 
(17th ed. 1993); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. 
Ohia 1965) ("Almost every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion 
contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty 
of silence55). 
A patient's reasonable expectation of confidentiality is further evidenced by the 
widely publicized privacy protections afforded by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Among other things, HIPAA 
precludes a physician from unilaterally disclosing medical information even when the 
patient's condition is at issue in litigation. A health care provider may disclose protected 
health information only upon receiving satisfactory assurance that the requesting party 
has notified the subject of the request. See 65 Fed.Reg. at 82,814-15; Law v. Zuckerman, 
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307 F.Supp.2d 705, 710-711 (D.Md. 2004) (HIPAA bars disclosures absent express 
consent of the patient or court order). 
The considerations articulated by one of the earliest courts to recognize an implied 
contractual duty of confidentiality apply with even greater force today: 
Any time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, and the consensual 
relationship of physician and patient is established, two jural obligations (of 
significance here) are simultaneously assumed by the doctor. Doctor and patient 
enter into a simple contract, the patient hoping that he will be cured and the doctor 
optimistically assuming that he will be compensated. As an implied condition of 
that contract, this Court is of the opinion that the doctor warrants that any 
confidential information gained through the relationship will not be released 
without the patient's permission. . . . The promise of secrecy is as much an express 
warranty as the advertisement of a commercial entrepreneur. Consequently, when a 
doctor breaches his duty of secrecy, he is in violation of part of his obligations 
under the contract. 
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801. 
In light of patient expectations fostered by the medical community over the past 
two thousand years, it was error for the trial court to adopt Barbuto's argument that the 
duties arising from the implied contractual relationship between physician and patient do 
not include confidentiality. Moreover, that duty cannot retroactively evaporate upon the 
termination of the relationship. Information learned by a physician in the course of 
medical treatment does not suddenly lose its confidential status when the patient transfers 
to another health care provider. 
The trial court ruled that no private right of action exists under HIPAA. Sorensen 
acknowledges that, to date, no court has recognized such a claim. See, e.g., Bradford v. 
Semar, 2005 WL 1806344 (E.D.Mo. 2005, listing cases). Accordingly, Sorensen does not 
argue a direct cause of action under HIPAA in the present appeal. However, HIPAA and 
its regulations remain evidence of the standard of care, Barbuto's knowledge and 
disregard of the illegality of his conduct, and of Sorensen's reasonable expectations. 
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Sorensen's breach of contract claim against Barbuto is not barred by the absence 
of a written contract. Consequently, the trial court's judgment must be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIM CAN 
BE MAINTAINED FOR BARBUTO'S ALLEGED BREACH OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY. 
In the court below, Barbuto did not dispute that a physician owes an actionable tort 
duty of confidentiality. As the Utah Supreme Court wrote in Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 
191, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958), it is obligatory upon a doctor not to reveal information 
obtained in confidence in connection with the diagnosis or treatment of his patient, and 
"if the doctor violates that confidence and publishes derogatory matter concerning his 
patient, an action would lie for any injury suffered." See also Newman v. Sonnenberg, 
2003 UT App 401, ^ 9, 81 P.3d 808 ("[F]rom the moment a patient enters a doctor's 
office, fills out forms, and speaks to a doctor, that doctor owes the patient a duty of 
reasonable care (e.g., a duty of confidentiality and duty not to exploit the patient). . . ."). 
A key basis for the Supreme Court's observation in Berry was the reality that "[a 
physician's] professional status and his duty to keep the confidence of his patient tend to 
endow information he gives with more than ordinary credibility." 331 P.2d at 819. In 
this case, Barbuto's alleged willingness to change his diagnosis for financial 
consideration not only breached Sorensen's confidence, but also deprived Sorensen of an 
important component in his underlying trial, objective, truthful testimony by a treating 
physician. As the court observed in Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 405: 
The defendant treating physician here was the crucial link and indispensable 
source of knowledge and pertinent facts about Mrs. Aufrichtig's case and 
condition for the purpose of her insurance medical benefits. Others would 
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ordinarily be expected to rely on this unique source and did so, in the most formal 
and official setting, according to this record. His assertion was not a casual 
expression of belief, but was a voluntary and willful affirmation of the crucial false 
facts and professional opinion. Plaintiffs had engaged his services rightfully 
expecting not only reasonable medical care and competence, but also truthful, 
continuing, necessary supply of medical information, when required. 
M a t 405. 
In contending that no breach of confidentiality can be maintained in this case, 
Barbuto made two assertions. First, he argued that Sorensen's complaint did not specify 
the confidential information that had been disclosed. (R. 101-102, 106). Second, 
Barbuto argued that, once a patient files a claim involving personal injury, there are no 
limits, restrictions, or duties of any kind regarding a physician's disclosure of medical 
information to third parties. (R. 20-21). Because the arguments are related, they are 
addressed together below. 
Barbuto's first argument, that Sorensen was required to identify the specific 
confidential information disclosed, is without merit. U.R.Civ.P. 8 contemplates basic 
notice pleading; specificity requirements are limited to those claims identified in 
U.R.Civ.P. 9. The complaint alleges that confidential information was disclosed (R. 6, T[ 
17), and there is no provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring further elucidation 
in the initial pleading. That is the purpose of discovery. (Indeed, considering that, by 
definition, a patient is not privy to the content of ex parte communications, such a 
pleading requirement would essentially preclude all claims.) 
In any event, though, the complaint does put Barbuto on notice of what Sorensen 
claims comprised Barbuto's breach of duty. The duty was breached in at least three 
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separate ways: 1) through improper ex parte communications; 2) disclosure of mental 
impressions and other information regarding Sorensen that was not in Barbuto's records; 
and 3) disclosure of false or inaccurate information. 
1. The ex parte communications between Barbuto and opposing counsel 
were a breach of confidentiality. 
The complaint alleges that, without notice to Sorensen, Barbuto voluntarily 
engaged in ex parte discussions with opposing counsel regarding Sorensen5s medical 
condition. Although some courts have ruled otherwise, an emerging majority of courts 
appears to hold that, when a patient places his medical condition at issue, information 
relevant to that condition may be disclosed only pursuant to proper (formal) means. See 
Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, "Discovery: Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured 
Party's Treating Physician," 50 A.L.RAth 714 (compiling cases on both sides of issue); 
Philip H. Corboy, "Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiffs Physician and Defense 
Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial," 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 
1001, 1003 (1990) ("Recent state court decisions, including several overruling prior 
precedent, now reflect a strong majority view that condemns ex parte conferences"), and 
cases cited. 
Even when a patient has waived his privilege or a privilege is deemed not to exist 
by virtue of asserting a claim, "the question remains by what procedures and subject to 
what controls the exchange of information shall proceed." Jones v. Asheville 
Radiological Group, 129 N.C.App. 449, 500 S.E.2d 740, 748 (1998). The waiver or 
absence of a privilege does not determine the means by which otherwise confidential 
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information is disclosed. See, e.g., Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 191 W.Va. 426, 
446 S.E.2d 648, 655 (1994) ("The patient's implicit consent . . . is obviously and 
necessarily limited; he does not consent, simply by filing suit, to his physician's 
discussing his medical confidences with third parties outside court-authorized discovery 
methods, nor does he consent to his physician's discussing the patient's confidences in an 
ex parte conference with the patient's adversary"); Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 161 
F.Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (prohibition against ex parte communications "affects 
defense counsel's methods, not the substance of what is discoverable"); Duquette v. 
Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 272, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (App. 1980) ("even where the 
physician-patient privilege has been impliedly waived, the holder of the privilege waives 
only his right to object to discovery of pertinent medical information which is sought 
through the formal methods of discovery authorized by the applicable Rules of Civil 
Procedures"). 
Absent any supervision by the patient over the disclosure, a risk is posed that 
discussions will stray into improper areas. Jones, 500 S.E.2d at 748 ("Requiring 
defendants to abide by formal discovery rules in obtaining medical records from a non-
party physician, even where the patient has waived the physician-patient privilege, 
protects the patient from disclosure of aspects of her mental and physical health which 
may be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible in court"). 
By their very nature, ex parte communications deprive the patient of any 
knowledge or control over what actually transpires. "The plaintiffs counsel rarely is 
notified and may leam of the interviews only much later. It is virtually impossible to 
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determine whether disclosures of privileged confidences or other improprieties occurred 
during the interviews. In essence, defense counsel has been able to take advantage of the 
limited waiver of the patient privilege while evading the adversarial safeguards embodied 
in formal discovery." Corboy, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. at 1007. 
The Morris court summarized its concerns with ex parte contact between a treating 
physician and opposing counsel thus: 
Even if no improper pressure were brought to bear on a physician, it would, 
nevertheless, often be difficult for the defense to determine on its own if and to 
what extent the physician-patient privilege was waived. Parties may be in 
substantial disagreement over the kinds of injuries put in issue by the pleadings. . . 
. Whether a physical or mental condition is in controversy often requires careful 
judicial scrutiny and not a mere cursory reading of the complaint. . . . The 
determination of whether a medical condition is in controversy often requires 
specialized knowledge of the relevant factors which a court may look to in 
deciding a case. . . . By restricting disclosure to that obtainable pursuant to statute, 
court rule, or express consent, the patient's attorney will be afforded an 
opportunity to object to the disclosure of medical information that is remote, 
irrelevant, or otherwise improper, the court will be afforded an opportunity to 
regulate disclosure, and needless lawsuits for breach of confidence will be 
avoided. 
446 S.E.2d at 656, quoting Anker v. Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), 
aff d, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1979), appeal dismissed, 411 N.E.2d 783, 795 
(1980) (court's ellipses); see also Jordan v. Sinai Hospital, 171 Mich.App. 328, 429 
N.W.2d 891 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds, 435 N.W.2d 347 ("The 
physician's ethical duty of loyalty and the implied promise of confidentiality which arise 
upon treatment favor a bar on ex parte interviews, as does the fiduciary nature of the 
relationship between patient and physician. The formal rules of discovery provide 
defense counsel with all relevant information"). 
24 
One of the leading decisions recognizing the need for a limitation on the means of 
disclosing otherwise discoverable medical information is Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 
Inc., 148 111. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986). After a comprehensive analysis of the 
arguments both for and against ex parte communications, the court concluded that public 
policy militates against such unrestricted contact: 
[W]e believe that modern public policy strongly favors the confidential and 
fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and his physician. We further 
believe that this public policy arises from the fact that society possesses an 
established and beneficial interest in the sanctity of the physician-patient 
relationship. We find this public policy to be reflected in at least two separate 
indicia: (1) the promulgated code of ethics adopted by the medical profession and 
upon which the public relies to be faithfully executed so as to protect the 
confidential relationship existing between a patient and his physician; and (2) the 
fiduciary relationship, recognized by courts in Illinois as well as courts throughout 
the United States, which exists between a patient and his treating physician. . . . 
[W]e believe, for the reasons set forth above, that ex parte conferences between 
defense counsel and a plaintiffs treating physician jeopardize the sanctity of the 
physician-patient relationship, and, therefore, are prohibited as against public 
policy. 
499 N.E.2d at 957. 
An argument that, in hindsight, particular information disclosed turned out to be 
admissible anyway - the judicial equivalent of "no harm, no foul" - does not override the 
concern that protection of a patient's basic rights should not be left to opposing counsel 
and a doctor (particularly one being paid by the opposing party). See, e.g., Crescenzo v. 
Crane, 350 N. J. Super. 531, 796 A.2d 283 (2002) ('The determination of whether the 
records are ultimately admissible should not in the first instance by made be a doctor 
responding to a subpoena or an attorney who violates the Rule and improperly subpoenas 
the records. . . . That determination must be made in a courtroom by a judge consistent 
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with appropriate due process concerns including notice and an opportunity to be heard"); 
see also Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986) 
("Placing the burden of determining relevancy on an attorney, who does not know the 
nature of the confidential disclosure about to be elicited, is risky. Asking the physician, 
untrained in the law, to assume this burden is a greater gamble and is unfair to the 
physician"). 
Barbuto contends, however, that once a patient's medical condition is at issue in a 
lawsuit, there are no restrictions on the manner or type of disclosures that a physician can 
make, because at that point "the patient's privacy becomes moot." (R. 27; also R. 25 
(claiming that patient has no legitimate expectation of privacy at all once claim is filed)). 
Barbuto argued that Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d)(1) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 
allow unfettered ex parte communications between physicians and opposing counsel (and 
anyone else, actually, under Barbuto's theory). 
This Court has already rejected that argument. In Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 
58, 999 P.2d 582, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (2000), without notice to his patient, defendant 
Goates provided an affidavit regarding the patient's health to opposing counsel in a hotly 
contested divorce action. In a subsequent lawsuit by the patient, Goates argued that he 
was permitted to do so by Rule 506 and Section 78-24-8(4) because the patient's 
condition was at issue in the underlying case. The trial court agreed, entering summary 
judgment for the defendant. 
On appeal, this Court reversed. The Court initially noted that Section 78-24-8(4) 
has been superseded by U.R.E. 506(d)(1), and therefore Goates could not rely on the 
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statute to excuse his conduct. Id at \ 24 n. 2 ("The statutory privilege has no further 
effect. Physician-patient and therapist-patient privileges are now exclusively controlled 
by Rule 506").4 
The Court then addressed Dr. Goates's claimed entitlement to ex parte disclosures 
under U.R.E. 506. The Court first concluded that the exception to physician-patient 
privilege in Rule 506 applies any time a patient's medical condition is placed at issue in 
litigation, even if done so by another party. Consequently, Mrs. Debry's medical 
condition was at issue at the time of the disclosure. Id, fflf 25-27. 
However, the Court disagreed that, merely because his patient's medical condition 
was at issue, Dr. Goates had free rein in discussing that condition with opposing counsel. 
The Court observed that, "although this exception to the privilege is broad enough to let a 
nonpatient raise the patient's mental state as an issue in proceedings, access to medical 
records is still constrained." Id, ^ 26, citing State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ^ 30, 982 P.2d 
79. Even when Rule 506 applies, "[a] nonpatient 'does not have the right to examine all 
of the confidential information or to search through files without supervision.'" Id. "If, 
after review, the court determines the records contain material evidence, the records 
4
 Barbuto acknowledged below that "Rule 506 is intended to supersede § 78-24-8, at least 
with respect to the first two sentences in the statute which establish the privilege," but 
argued that he can still rely on the statute because it has "never been repealed" and is not 
inconsistent with Rule 506. Whether it has been repealed is immaterial; the superseded 
statute is of no effect. As for alleged inconsistency, it is significant that the statute is the 
only source to which Barbuto can point in claiming an entitlement to unsupervised, 
undisclosed ex parte disclosures. (R. 21 n. 1, asserting that under the statute, "a treating 
physician is free to provide information and interviews" without restriction.). The fact 
that Barbuto must cite the superseded statute rather than Rule 506 to make such an 
argument illustrates the extent to which the two provisions differ. 
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should be exposed only to the extent necessary to present the evidence, thereby striking a 
balance between the important interests of physician-patient confidentiality and the 
pursuit of a claim or defense." Id. 
As in this case, Dr. Goates made no effort to safeguard his patient's 
confidentiality. "From all that appears, Dr. Goates voluntarily furnished an affidavit 
about his patient's mental condition to her adversary in divorce litigation," the Court 
observed. "Dr. Goates gave his affidavit without a court order, without a subpoena, and 
without even notifying Debry. She had no opportunity to assert her privilege." Id., ^ 27. 
The Court held that, "under these circumstances, a patient must at least be afforded 
the opportunity for protection. As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist 
has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he 
has as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in pending 
litigation." Id, ]f 28. "Before disclosing confidential patient records or communications 
in a subsequent litigation," the court wrote, "a physician or therapist should notify the 
patient. Even if the communications may fall into this exception to the privilege, the 
patient has the right to be notified of the potential disclosure of confidential records. 
Such notice assures that the patient can pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in 
court to avoid unnecessary disclosure." Id5 
5
 This ruling is consistent with the fact that, even in the few states that do not recognize 
an evidentiary patient-physician privilege at all, a physician's duty of confidentiality is 
held to preclude voluntary disclosure. See McCormick, supra (recognizing cause of 
action for unauthorized disclosure even though South Carolina does not have a 
testimonial privilege for physicians; "the terms 'privilege' and 'confidences' are not 
synonymous, and a professional's duty to maintain his client's confidences is independent 
28 
It is undisputed in this case that Barbuto made no attempt to notify Sorensen of his 
disclosures to, and discussions with, opposing counsel, let alone that he was doing so for 
personal gain. Moreover, notification alone will be insufficient to protect the patient's 
rights in most instances. A physician like Barbuto and/or an attorney is likely to refuse 
any oversight by the patient of the disclosure. (Indeed, Barbuto refused even to show his 
report to Sorensen's counsel, asserting "work product" on behalf of opposing counsel. 
See Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 6, f 8). Under such circumstances, general notification that 
disclosures will be made does nothing to allow the patient to lodge objections as to their 
scope or manner. Protection of patients' rights requires, at a minimum, some form of 
participation by plaintiff and/or his counsel in the disclosure process, such as his presence 
during conversations about his medical condition, or obtaining the information through a 
list of questions disclosed prior to the interview, or through deposition or other court 
authorized procedure. 
2. The complaint sufficiently alleges that Barbuto disclosed information 
that had not previously been disclosed. 
Barbuto also argued below that he could not have breached his duty of 
confidentiality because he did nothing more than review records that had already been 
disclosed. (R. 23-24). That factual assertion ignores the allegations of Sorensen's 
Complaint. One of Sorensen's primary complaints is that Barbuto disclosed opinions, 
observations, and other information that were not in the records disclosed, for example, 
of the issue whether he can be legally compelled to reveal some or all of those 
confidences, that is, whether those communications are privileged"). 
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changing his diagnosis to something far different from that stated in his own medical 
records. A new spin on a physician's own diagnosis is, by definition, previously 
undisclosed information. See also 1 Utah Prac, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 
(2004), Rule 506 (physician-patient privilege "applies not only to communications 
between patient and physician, but also to facts obtained by the physician by examination 
or observation"). 
Moreover, if Barbuto did nothing more than disclose information that had already 
been disclosed in the medical records, why an hours-long meeting with opposing counsel? 
A reasonable inference can be drawn from that fact alone that Barbuto discussed 
information beyond the bare content of the medical records themselves. 
3. The disclosure of false information is a breach of confidentiality. 
The third form of breach of confidentiality alleged in the complaint is that Barbuto 
changed his original, longstanding diagnosis without any basis for doing so (other than 
monetary gain), in other words, that Barbuto's "new" diagnosis was essentially false. A 
physician's duty of confidentiality includes an obligation, when disclosing confidential 
information, to do so truthfully. See Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 404 ("part of a physician's 
duty to the patient, when authorized to supply otherwise confidential information to 
others—either as a result of a patient's express consent or waiver by the condition having 
been placed in issue—includes truthful utterances"). Sorensen's allegations state a claim 
for breach of confidentiality in this aspect of Barbuto's conduct as well. 
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III. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT SUPPORT A CLAIM 
THAT BARBUTO BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO 
SORENSEN. 
Utah law has long recognized that the physician-patient relationship is fiduciary in 
nature. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (noting "fiduciary nature of the 
[physician-patient] relationship" imposes duty to disclose any material information 
concerning the patient's physical condition); see also First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Utah 1990) (class of relationships 
giving rise to duty of disclosure includes "where it is either presumed in law or proved in 
fact that one party is in a superior or dominant position and the other in an inferior or 
servient position. These relations include those evolving from domestic relations as well 
as relations between . . . doctor and patient"). 
The fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship is widely recognized. 
See, e.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.2d 348 (Fla. 2002), and cases cited; Eckhardt v. 
Charter Hospital, 124 N.M. 549, 953 P.2d 722, 726-27 (N.M. App. 1997); McCormick, 
492 S.E.2d at 435 ("Being a fiduciary relationship, mutual trust and confidence [in 
physician-patient relationship] are essential"); Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 404 ("The 
physician-patient relationship thus operates and flourishes in an atmosphere of 
transcendent trust and confidence and is infused with fiduciary obligations"). 
As a fiduciary, Barbuto owed several discrete duties implicated by his alleged 
misconduct. 
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1. Duty of confidentiality. 
One of the most basic of a fiduciary's duties is confidentiality. See, e.g., Kilpatrick 
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah 1996) ("As fiduciaries, attorneys 
have a legal duty 'to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to preserve the client's 
confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the representation of the 
client"). 
The duty not to disclose confidential information necessarily extends beyond the 
termination of the relationship through which the information was obtained. Envirotech 
Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 496 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied (former employee's 
fiduciary duty not to use confidential information to his advantage remained in force three 
years after termination). Any other conclusion would force a patient to either remain with 
the same health care provider in perpetuity, or subject himself to former providers' whims 
with respect to his confidential information. (To avoid duplication, other issues relating 
to confidentiality are addressed supra at pp. 20-30.) 
2. Duty of loyalty. 
Under Utah law, fiduciaries are required to be "completely loyal to their clients." 
Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, H 16, 67 P.3d 1042. Such loyalty includes a duty not 
to, voluntarily and for personal gain, take positions adverse to one's patient. See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa.Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962) (physician's "confidential or 
fiduciary capacity as to their patients . . . includes a duty to refuse affirmative assistance 
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to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The doctor, of course, owes a duty to conscience 
to speak the truth; he need, however, speak only at the proper time").6 
3. Duty not to take advantage of client confidences. 
In addition to the foregoing duties, fiduciaries "must never use their position of 
trust to take advantage of client confidences for themselves or for other parties." Walter, 
2003 UT App 86, ^ 16. The allegations of Sorensen's complaint are that Barbuto abused 
his position of trust as a former treating physician for his own gain and that of an 
opposing party. 
IV. BARBUTO'S ALLEGED ACTIONS VIOLATE THE GENERAL 
DUTIES OWED BY A PHYSICIAN TO A PATIENT. 
It is alleged in this case that Barbuto changed his original diagnosis - upon which 
the patient and subsequent physicians relied for years - without telling anyone (except 
6
 A physician's duty not to turn one's self into an adversary is different from the 
obligation to testify truthfully, a distinction as basic as that between fact witness and an 
expert witness. See Alexander B. McNaughton and Susan McNaughton, "Divided 
Loyalty: The Dilemma of the Treating Physcian Advocate," 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
1051 (1997) ("There is a vast difference, however, in a treating physician testifying as a 
fact witness based on personal observations and as an advocate."); Schaffer v. Spicer 88 
S.D. 36, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (allowing claims against psychiatrist who 
voluntarily gave affidavit to opposing counsel), quoting Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 805 
("assuming, but without deciding, that the plaintiff waived the testimonial privilege 
because of the deposition, this 'waiver' does not authorize a private conference between 
doctor and defense lawyer. It is one thing to say that a doctor may be examined and cross-
examined by the defense in a courtroom, in conformity with the rules of evidence, with 
the vigilant surveillance of plaintiffs counsel, and the careful scrutiny of the trial judge; it 
is quite another matter to permit, as alleged here, an unsupervised conversation between 
the doctor and his patient's protagonist"). 
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opposing counsel) that his original diagnosis was wrong.7 In the court below, Barbuto 
argued that, once a physician is no longer treating a patient, he has no duty to advise his 
former patient of new information. (R. 108-109). That position might be tenable if this 
case involved new technology or some other matter that could not fairly be placed upon 
the original physician's shoulders. That is not Sorensen's claim, though. 
Sorensen alleges that Barbuto's so-called "new information" was a conclusion that 
the physician's own prior diagnosis was (allegedly) erroneous. If, as Barbuto claims, his 
change of heart was sincere, then he owed Sorensen a duty to notify him, and/or his 
subsequent treating physicians, that his own original diagnosis should no longer be 
considered reliable. See, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Development 
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990) (fiduciary duty of disclosure, including 
between "relations between . . . doctor and patient" includes "subsequently acquired 
information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that 
when made was true or believed to be so"), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 551. 
The duty of care generally owed by physician to patient is to exercise that degree 
of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised, under similar circumstances, by 
other practitioners in his field, and to use ordinary reasonable care and diligence, and his 
best judgment, in applying his skill to patient's case. Farrow v. Health Services 
7
 As Barbuto put it during his deposition in the underlying case, his original diagnosis 
might have "created a mythology" in Sorensen's subsequent medical treatment. {See 
Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 61). Notably, opposing counsel's letter retaining Barbuto's 
services requested Barbuto to let counsel know what Barbuto thought, "as his treating 
physician early on in his injury, about his current condition." Id., Bates 21 (emphasis 
added). 
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Corporation, 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979). Those duties include the duty to disclose to 
that patient that which is in his best interests and important that he should know. 
Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354 n. 18. If a reasonable patient would consider the information 
important in the course of treatment, the information is material and disclosure is 
required. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 n. 6 (Utah 1989). In this case, a jury could find 
that a complete reversal in his diagnosis by the physician who treated Sorensen for the 
first year and a half after his accident would be important to know. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT SORENSEN 
COULD NOT MAINTAIN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF PRIVACY. 
One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for resulting 
harm to the interests of the other. The right of privacy is invaded by, among other things, 
unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, or publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light before the public. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 
1988). 
Barbuto did not dispute below that his modified report placed Sorensen in a false 
light. Rather, his sole basis for seeking dismissal of Sorensen's breach of privacy claim 
was that there was no public disclosure, and that Sorensen had no legitimate expectation 
of privacy. (The fact that a patient maintains an expectation of privacy, albeit limited, in 
a personal injury lawsuit has been addressed above, see pp. 20-30, supra.) 
With respect to whether the disclosure was sufficiently public, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that disclosure of private information "to a small group of persons . . . 
does not constitute public disclosure." Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, % 
35 
12, 16 P.3d 555. That is not dispositive of Sorensen's claim, however. In the underlying 
case, the only way for Sorensen to obtain partial relief from the effects of Barbuto's 
misconduct required that Barbuto's deposition be filed with the court in the underlying 
case, thus becoming a matter of public record. That is the epitome of public disclosure.8 
Additionally, there is no specific "body count" required to maintain an action for 
invasion of privacy. Sheila D'Ambrosio, "Invasion of Privacy By Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts," 43 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 449 ("While an actionable disclosure is 
generally one made only to a large number of people, it cannot be said that disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts to a comparatively small number of people will automatically 
be insufficient to constitute a public disclosure. There is no magic formula or 'body 
count' that can be given to permit counsel to determine with certainty whether the number 
of persons to whom private facts have been disclosed will be sufficient in any particular 
case to satisfy the public disclosure requirement"). 
Barbuto's argument below failed to afford Sorensen all reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn from the complaint. An allegation that private information was disclosed 
to opposing counsel inherently encompasses others to whom counsel ordinarily might 
reasonably be expected to relay such information. In this case, it is reasonable to infer 
that counsel relayed the information to his client, to the client's liability insurance carrier 
8
 Barbuto represented to the court below that he "only testified at deposition because 
plaintiffs required him to do so." (R. 108 at 10). That assertion was misleading. Once 
the covert arrangement between his former treating physician and opposing counsel was 
discovered, there was no other way for Sorensen to explore what had transpired and to 
advise the court. As noted above, Barbuto refused initially even to give Sorensen a copy 
of his report, invoking "work product" on behalf of opposing counsel. 
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- who was making decisions regarding settlement - as well as to other expert witness(es) 
and other employees of his firm. (The specific identities of these others can only be 
obtained through discovery.)9 
A minimum "body count" rule would not apply in this case in any event, because 
the disclosure was made in violation of a duty of trust. See 11 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and 
Publicity (2005), § 25 ("A communication to one individual, or a few, or to a small group 
of people absent breach of contract, trust or other confidential relationship, will not give 
rise to liability"; emphasis added). For each of these reasons, the trial court erred in 
dismissing Sorensen's claim for invasion of privacy, and the judgment should be 
reversed. 
V. SORENSEN STATED A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
A plaintiff is entitled to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff (a) with 
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would 
have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be 
9
 Apart from opposing counsel, the client and expert witnesses, communications with at 
least two other individuals within opposing counsel's firm are mentioned in Barbuto's 
records. (E.g., Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 19, 124). Even under Rule 9, specificity 
requirements are relaxed if the circumstances are such that the plaintiff cannot be 
expected to have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the wrongdoing. Arena 
Land & Investment Co. v. McGee, 906 F.Supp. 1470, 1476 (D.Utah 1994). A privacy 
claim is not subject to heightened pleading requirements, but the same principle should 
apply. If it is reasonable to believe that further disclosures occurred - almost a certainty 
in a case like this - the plaintiff should be able to discover that information. If it turns out 
that, contrary to expectation, no such disclosures occurred, the matter can be resolved 
through voluntary dismissal or summary judgment. 
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considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, f^ 10, 26 P.3d 
227, citing Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 244, 247 (1961), citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. 
In this case, Barbuto argued that, as a matter of law, his conduct cannot be 
considered outrageous because its lawfulness was "fairly debatable" under Utah law. (R. 
25-26). This suggestion cannot withstand the allegations themselves, which include that 
Barbuto, voluntarily and in furtherance of a personal agenda, made false statements 
regarding his patient to a third party to enable that party to gain an advantage over his 
patient, and accepted compensation from that party to reverse his prior opinions and 
records. That is not "fairly debatable" conduct for a physician. See, e.g., AMA E-
Principles, E -9.04 (1994) ("incompetence, corruption, or dishonest or unethical conduct 
on the part of members of the medical profession is reprehensible"). 
Whether particular conduct of a defendant was outrageous or intolerable is a 
question of fact for the jury. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1995) (whether 
promise by already married man to marry plaintiff was outrageous was question for the 
jury). Significantly, the Jackson court recognized that, while "the mere decision to 
withdraw from a planned marriage is an insufficient basis for this cause of action," it 
became actionable if the defendant "acted with the intention of deceiving Jackson and 
with the knowledge that his actions would cause emotional distress." Id. Likewise, while 
the disclosure of confidential medical information might in some instances be insufficient 
to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a jury question is 
38 
presented when evidence exists that such disclosure was done sub rosa and for the 
purpose of furthering the physician's personal agenda. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS. 
In the court below, Barbuto offered, and the trial court adopted, "as a threshold 
issue" that the allegation of intentional disclosure precluded a negligence claim. (CR. (R. 
27 ("Plaintiffs don't shed any light on how a general negligence claim can arise from 
allegedly intentional tortuous [sic] conduct.") 
While Barbuto might have been uncertain as to how allegations of negligent and 
intentional misconduct can co-exist, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have made it 
clear on several occasions. In Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), for 
example, it was undisputed that the defendant's actions were intentional, in that he fully 
intended to throw a tootsie pop and to hit plaintiff with it. The defendant denied, 
however, that he intended to harm the plaintiff. Id. at 322. 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because the 
defendant intended his actions, the actions must constitute assault and battery as a matter 
of law, and therefore were governed by the 1-year statute of limitations instead of the 
ordinary 4-year personal injury statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, but 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed, observing: 
An individual may undertake an intentional act, such as throwing the tootsie pop in 
this particular case, and if the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a 
substantial certainty that harm will result from the act, the actor is not guilty of an 
intentional tort. Instead, in such a situation, the activity is properly classified as 
reckless disregard of safety or reckless misconduct. 
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Id. at 322. "It is this absence of intent to harm which renders reckless misconduct or 
reckless disregard of safety a form of negligence and not an intentional tort," the court 
observed. Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial. 
In Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), this Court likewise reversed a 
summary judgment that had been granted upon a theory that a negligence claim could not 
be pursued because the defendant's sexual acts were intentional. "An individual's acts 
can simultaneously give rise to a claim for negligence and a claim for an intentional tort," 
the court said. Id, at 1162. "The two doctrines are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
rather may overlap and coexist on a continuum." Id. at 1162-1163. 
In reversing the summary judgment, the Court concluded, "the trial court appears 
to have misunderstood this continuum in holding that defendant's actions could not, as a 
matter of law, constitute negligence since they were intentional." Id. at 1163. The court 
observed that it was bound by the recognition in Matheson, supra, that "reckless 
misconduct is a form of negligence and is distinguishable from an intentional tort." Id.; 
see also 51A Am. Jur.2d Negligence § 276 ("An individual may undertake an intentional 
act, and if the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a substantial certainty that 
harm will result from the act, the actor is not guilty of an intentional tort"). 
It is possible for an intentional disclosure to be negligently made. (And a plaintiff 
is permitted to allege so in the alternative. U.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2)). For example, Barbuto 
claimed below that he did not know that his conduct was unlawful. If the fact finder 
believes him, it might still conclude that he was negligent for making no effort to 
determine its legality, for falling below the standard of care in disclosing the information, 
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for failing to recognize the scope of his fiduciary duties, for placing his interests above 
those of his former patient, and so forth. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SORENSEN HAD 
FAILED TO PLEAD DAMAGES ADEQUATELY. 
As noted previously, for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts 
alleged in the complaint are considered true, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor 
of the plaintiffs claims. Sorensen alleged in his complaint that he suffered economic and 
general damages. (R. 7, 9, Tflj 19, 35). 
Barbuto argues, however, that because Sorensen was successful in filing an 
emergency motion in limine in the underlying case preventing Barbuto from testifying as 
to his modified diagnosis, no harm resulted from his breach of duty. The fact that 
Sorensen was able to partially alleviate the harm done by Barbuto5s betrayal of his 
fiduciary duties and breach of confidentiality does not eliminate other harm already done. 
See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 139-140 
(Utah App. 1992) (defendant's eventual payment of excess judgment entered against the 
plaintiff as a result of its misconduct reduced damages, but did not eliminate claim for 
general damages). 
By its very nature, the violation of a patient's trust can be expected to cause 
emotional distress and other general damages. See Elder, Privacy Torts § 5.2 (delineating 
wide range of general damages recoverable for breach of confidentiality); see also 
Machan v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, 2005 UT 37, ^[ 12, 16, 19 n. 2, 
30, 116 P.3d 342 (nature of insurance contract is to provide peace of mind, therefore, 
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plaintiffs damages may include emotional distress). In addition to general damages, 
Sorensen also alleged economic damages, including additional legal fees and costs (e.g., 
having to take a deposition of Barbuto to explore his improper activities), and an 
entitlement to punitive damages. Sorensen's damages were sufficiently pled, and the trial 
court erred by adopting Barbuto's argument and dismissing the complaint.10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse 
the judgment of the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 day of August, 2005. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
lumphery^ 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Pldintiffs/Appellants 
10
 Even if a fact finder determined that specific damages could not be established for 
Barbuto's breach of duty, the law recognizes equitable remedies in such a situation. E.g., 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763 (1980) (where government could not 
establish damages from defendant's breach of confidentiality, constructive trust on 
defendant's monetary gain would be imposed). Sorensen's complaint includes a prayer 
for equitable relief. (R. 10). 
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JOHN P. BARBUTO, individually, 
JOHN P. BARBUTO, M.D., P.C., : 
dba NEUROLOGY IN FOCUS, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement by 
the Court after the submission of Memoranda and oral argument by 
counsel. After further review and consideration, the Court rules 
as follows. 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in full as 
prayed for. By this reference, the Court incorporates herein all 
of the legal analyses and authorities set forth in defendants' 
Memoranda in support and reply, including that DeBry v. Goates. 999 
P.2d 582 (Utah App„ 2000), has no application to the present case 
because its facts are highly distinguishable. 
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2. Counsel for defendants is instructed to submit an Order 
consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS SORENSEN; KEVIN and 
PAMELA SORENSEN, limited guardians and 
conservators of Nicholas Sorensen, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN P. BARBUTO, individually; JOHN P. 
BARBUTO, M.D., P C , dba NEUROLOGY 
IN FOCUS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 040916294 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by 
Defendants (hereafter "Dr. Barbuto55). The Court has reviewed the written memoranda 
and the legal authorities cited therein filed by Dr. Barbuto and Plaintiffs, and has heard 
and considered the oral argument of counsel. In considering the Motion to Dismiss, the 
Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs5 Complaint, which 
include the following material facts: 
1. Nicholas Sorensen ("Mr. Sorensen") was injured in an automobile accident 
on July 24, 1999. (Complaint, 11 5.) 
2. For the next year and a half (which means until approximately February 
2001), Dr. Barbuto treated Mr. Sorensen for his neurological symptoms. After 
approximately February 2001, Nicholas Sorenseifs neurologic care was transferred to 
Michael Goldstein and Western Neurological Associates. (Complaint, 11 6.) 
3. Mr. Sorensen filed a legal action against Jack W Marcelis and others seeking 
monetary damages for personal injuries received in the July 1999 accident. This legal 
action was resolved by trial in October 2003, resulting in a verdict in favor of Nicholas 
Sorensen. (Complaint, 11 7.) 
4. Defendant's medical records, including those from Dr. Barbuto, were 
"produced and were made part of the stipulated evidence at trial." (Complaint, 11 8.) 
5. After Mr. Marcelis's defense counsel subpoenaed Dr. Barbuto to testify at 
trial, Mr. Sorenseifs counsel in that action and counsel in this action, L. Rich Humpherys, 
took Dr. Barbuto's deposition. (Complaint, 11 8.) 
6. During the course of his deposition, it was disclosed that Dr. Barbuto had 
reviewed additional medical records sent to him by Mr. Marcelis's defense lawyer, had 
offered expert opinions as to the cause of Mr. Sorenseifs neurologic symptoms, and had 
agreed to testify at trial regarding the cause of Mr. Sorensen's symptoms. Plaintiffs allege 
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in this Complaint that Dr. Barbuto's expert opinion that was to be offered at trial differed 
from the diagnostic statements set forth in his medical records. (Complaint, 11 10.) 
7. Claiming surprise, because Dr. Barbuto's involvement had not previously 
been disclosed by counsel for Mr. Marcelis, Mr. Sorensen's attorney sought and obtained 
an order excluding Dr. Barbuto from testifying at trial. 
Based upon these facts, Plaintiffs assert theories of legal liability against Dr. Barbuto 
based upon "breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing53 (First Cause of 
Action), "breach of professional standards and statutes" (Second Cause of Action), 
"invasion of privacy55 (Third Cause of Action), "intentional infliction of emotional distress55 
(Fourth Cause of Action), and "negligence55 (Fifth Cause of Action). Plaintiffs do not 
allege the medical care provided by Dr. Barbuto to Mr. Sorensen following his injuries in 
the automobile accident of July 24, 1999 through February of 2001, when Mr. Sorensen 
began treatment with a different neurologist, was negligent. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that 
Dr. Barbuto5s liability arises solely out of his examination of medical records generated by 
other health care providers after February of 2001, and ex parte communications with and 
opinions rendered regarding the cause or causes of Mr. Sorensen5s symptoms to counsel 
defending the personal injury action. The factual and legal underpinning of all of 
Plaintiffs5 claims is the allegation that Dr. Barbuto breached a duty of physician-patient 
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confidentiality by providing expert opinions on the cause of Mr. Sorenseifs medical 
symptoms to counsel defending the personal injury claim brought by Mr. Sorensen. 
Based upon the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs5 Complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs5 claims alleging a breach 
of a duty of good faith and fair dealing fail to state a claim because there is no underlying 
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants to which a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing attaches. Plaintiffs' claim that there was an improper disclosure by Dr. 
Barbuto of confidential physician-patient information fails because Mr. Sorensen's medical 
condition and the medical records relating to it were placed at issue in the underlying 
personal injury action, and Dr. Barbuto was privileged by statute and Utah State Bar 
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, Opinion No. 99-03 to speak ex parte with counsel. 
This case is clearly distinguishable from the case of DeBry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 
999 P.2d 582 because, among other things, Dr. Goates disclosed confidential psychiatric 
information during a continuing physician-patient relationship, which disclosure was a de 
novo disclosure of confidential records. Neither does Plaintiffs5 citation to American 
Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics or Rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence 
create legal duties upon which a private right of action can be based. Similarly, there is no 
private cause of action for alleged violations of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. Plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims fail because Dr. Barbuto did not 
4 
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publically disclose private facts. Indeed, Utah law permitted disclosure and discussion of 
Mr. Sorensen's medical records, which were necessarily part of his personal injury claim. 
Additionally, the Complaint fails to allege a legal claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or to state a claim for negligence arising out of the physician-patient 
relationship. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate damages which could support a claim. 
Dr. Barbuto did not testify at Mr. Sorensen's trial and Plaintiffs have not alleged that Mr. 
Sorensen received any psychological evaluation or treatment for the alleged emotional 
distress, that Mr. Sorensen needed mental health counseling, that he suffered physical pain, 
that he suffered loss of employment or any other tangible injury associated distinctly with 
the claims against Dr. Barbuto. In the context of this case, allegations of distress and 
painful emotions, without tangible injury, are insufficient to support a claim for damages. 
For these reasons and for all other reasons set forth in Dr. Barbuto's supporting 
memoranda, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Plaintiffs5 Complaint and all claims 
asserted therein be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Each of the parties 
shall bear its respective costs and attorney's fees incurred to date. 
5 
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JACK W. MARCELIS, MICHELLE 
MARCELIS and SEAN MARCELIS, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 000905711 
Judge William B. Bohling 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: DR. JOHN P. BARBUTO 
SYNOPSIS 
After a serious accident on July 24, 1999, resulting in the death of one person and the 
extensive injury to the plaintiff, plaintiffs treating physician referred plaintiff to Dr. John 
Barbuto, neurologist, because of seizures from a brain injury. Dr. Barbuto's treatment began 
August 4, 1999 and ended early 2001, and largely dealt with prescribing anti-seizure medication 
and monitoring any seizure activity. The plaintiff changed to a different treating neurologist 
when Dr. Barbuto was no longer on the approved medical list for medical insurance purposes. 
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Dr. Barbuto's records were subpoenaed and have been disclosed. However, his 
deposition was not taken though Defendants subpoenaed Dr. Barbuto to be a witness at trial. 
Defendants have never disclosed at any time that Dr. Barbuto was involved as anything more 
than a fact witness. Totally unbeknown to plaintiffs counsel, defense counsel has been meeting 
with Dr. Barbuto ex parte without a HIPAA or any other release, and has retained him for 
purposes of reviewing extensive information and documents in order to render expert opinions at 
trial. 
Plaintiffs counsel first became suspicious on September 17, 2003, during a deposition of 
the defense expert, Dr. Weight, when defense counsel produced a new document from Dr. 
Barbuto's file. Still, defense counsel failed to disclose the extensive ex parte involvement with 
Dr. Barbuto even though plaintiffs counsel specifically inquired about it. Based on this 
suspicion, plaintiffs counsel met with Dr. Barbuto on September 25, 2003 and for the first time 
learned of defense counsel's extensive ex parte contact and retention of Dr. Barbuto. Because 
Dr. Barbuto and defense counsel have engaged in illegal ex parte contact (without a HIPAA 
release), because Dr. Barbuto openly caters to the defense bar and has an extreme defense bias, 
and because plaintiff has just discovered that Dr. Barbuto has changed his medical opinions from 
those contained in his medical records and has formed even new opinions in areas outside of his 
original treatment, plaintiff brings this motion in limine to exclude his testimony. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 11, 2003, defense counsel sent two releases to plaintiffs counsel 
and requested that plaintiff, Nicholas Sorensen, sign the releases, which would release medical 
information directly to defendants' counsel. See copy of defendants' proposed releases, marked 
as Exhibit 1 to the accompanying Affidavit of L. Rich Humpherys. 
2. Shortly after receiving defendants' request, plaintiffs counsel responded that 
plaintiffs counsel had a policy of not giving general releases to opposing counsel, because of the 
unfortunate experience of having some defense counsel attempt without notice to use the release 
for ex parte contact with plaintiffs treating physicians. Plaintiffs counsel offered to obtain any 
records defendants desired and would produce them, or defense counsel could simply subpoena 
the records. See f^l[ 1 and 2 of Affidavit. 
3. At no time has defense counsel attempted to take the deposition of Dr. Barbuto, 
nor has defense counsel ever given any notice that defendants intended to call Dr. Barbuto as an 
expert witness for the defense, but instead to only be a fact witness regarding his treatment of the 
plaintiff. Dr. Barbuto's records were obtained more than two years ago and submitted to 
opposing counsel and both counsel had stipulated to their admission as part of the total medical 
record exhibit. At no time did plaintiff ever suspect defense counsel of having made ex parte 
contact with Dr. Barbuto, for the purpose of providing him with new documents and infonnation 
and requesting him to render expert opinions for the defense. Id. U 3. 
4. On September 17, 2003, at the commencement of the deposition of Dr. David 
Weight (defendants' expert neuropsychologist), Tim Dunn produced a sheet of paper, which he 
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represented to be a photocopy of a page from Dr. Barbuto's file. Plaintiffs counsel asked if this 
was something in addition to the medical records that had already been produced. He indicated 
he thought it was. Plaintiffs counsel asked when and how Mr. Dunn got the document and he 
indicated that his associate, Steve Alderman had obtained it the day before from Dr. Barbuto's 
file. Plaintiffs counsel asked why Mr. Alderman was going through plaintiffs treating 
physician doctor's file without notice to us. Mr. Dunn indicated that they had a subpoena. 
Plaintiffs counsel stated that he had not received any notice of a subpoena, except for trial, nor 
any indication that opposing counsel would be going to Dr. Barbuto's office. Plaintiffs counsel 
then asked whether Mr. Dunn was hiring Dr. Barbuto as defendants' expert. Without denying it, 
Mr. Dunn simply stated he was paying for Dr. Barbuto's professional time, as he would with any 
professional. Plaintiffs counsel then asked if Mr. Dunn or his associates had personally met 
with Dr. Barbuto. Mr. Dunn indicated he was not sure what Mr. Alderman had done. Plaintiffs 
counsel then expressed that it would be highly inappropriate for opposing counsel to meet with 
plaintiffs treating physicians and eliciting expert opinions, without any notice to plaintiffs 
counsel. Mr. Dunn simply shrugged his shoulders, implying that he wasn't sure what was going 
on. Id H 4. 
5. Even though plaintiffs counsel had directly addressed this issue with Mr. Dunn, 
at no time thereafter did defense counsel ever disclose that anyone had met with Dr. Barbuto 
(other than to get a copy of the one page from Dr. Barbuto's file) or that defense counsel had 
provided Dr. Barbuto with information or that he was going to elicit expert opinions from Dr. 
Barbuto based on the information defense counsel had provided to him. Id. ^ 5. 
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6. After the deposition of Dr. Weight, plaintiffs counsel became more suspicious of 
what contact had been made with Dr. Barbuto and what Mr. Dunn intended to do when he called 
Dr. Barbuto at trial. Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel made an appointment with Dr. Barbuto and 
met with him on Thursday, September 25, 2003. When Julie Eriksson, a paralegal, and 
plaintiffs counsel sat down with Dr. Barbuto, without inquiry from plaintiffs counsel, Dr. 
Barbuto immediately began to explain that he wanted the record clear, he had met and talked 
with opposing counsel, had received extensive medical records from the office and had been 
asked to address certain questions, and was being paid by Mr. Dunn's office for his time. 
Plaintiffs counsel asked Dr. Barbuto if he had been retained as an expert. He answered that he 
had and he was responding to opposing counsel's request that he review the extensive medical 
records and render various opinions based on this review, the same kind of thing that he does in 
other cases when he is hired as an expert, except he had not seen plaintiff since his treatment. He 
also stated that opposing counsel had told him that opposing counsel was not going to refer to 
him as an "expert." He didn't understand this, but he professed that he didn't understand a lot 
about the legal profession. Id. ^ 6. 
7. Dr. Barbuto then began to explain that after meeting with defense counsel and 
reviewing additional information, he was changing his opinions that he had reached while 
treating the plaintiff. His conclusion while treating plaintiff and when contemporaneously 
reporting to Dr. Vogeler (plaintiffs primary treating and referring doctor) was that the seizures 
plaintiff had had after the accident were the result of the brain injury. Now, while not treating 
plaintiff nor reporting to Dr. Vogeler, he concludes that the seizures were a result of a preexisting 
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psychiatric and social (secondary gain) disorder. He readily admitted that his treating records 
and his course of treatment reflected the conclusion that the seizure activity was as a result of the 
brain injury, however, he was now changing his opinion. Id. j^ 7. 
8. During this conversation with Dr. Barbuto, plaintiffs counsel asked if he had 
prepared a report outlining his changed opinions. Dr. Barbuto indicated that he had prepared an 
extensive report (holding it in his hand) but that when he contacted Mr. Dunn's office and 
explained his opinions, he was told, for reasons he didn't understand, not to send his report to 
opposing counsel. Plaintiffs counsel asked to see the report. He refused, indicating that it was 
attorney work product, and that plaintiffs counsel would have to obtain permission from Mr. 
Dunn. Plaintiffs counsel reminded him that he was a treating physician and that plaintiffs 
counsel was representing his patient. Dr. Barbuto quickly responded that plaintiff was his patient 
and that presently he has no patient relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel then asked if 
he had prepared anything else pursuant to the request of Mr. Dunn's office. Dr. Barbuto stated 
that he had prepared numerous pages of notes, but again, he would not allow plaintiffs counsel 
to see them without Mr. Dunn's approval, claiming that it was attorney work product. Id. |^ 8. 
9. Over the years plaintiffs counsel has had numerous experiences with Dr. 
Barbuto. In all situations Dr. Barbuto was involved in testifying in behalf of the defense and his 
testimony is almost always the same—that secondary gain and other unrelated conditions are 
mostly, if not completely, the cause of any current problems, assuming the problems are real. Id. 
19. 
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10. In one of the last cases with plaintiffs counsel, Dr. Barbuto performed an 
independent medical examination (IME) of plaintiff Melia Fidel before any litigation, and found 
that she had a permanent partial disability rating of approximately 5 to 10% due to injuries she 
sustained in her neck from an accident. Being unable to reach a settlement, Mrs. Fidel retained 
plaintiffs counsel (here) to pursue her personal injury claim. When Dr. Barbuto was deposed, 
he completely renounced his prior report and claimed that Mrs. Fidel had only a minor neck 
strain which should have resolved within a few weeks after the accident and that there was 
nothing wrong with her. See T| 9 of Affidavit. 
11. At trial in the Fidel case, Dr. Barbuto demonstrated his extreme defense bias, 
testifying about how America's compensation system was to blame for not only Mrs. Fidel's 
complaints, but for most chronic syndromes in general, basing his conclusions upon studies that 
were allegedly done in foreign countries such as Greece and Lithuania where there are no 
compensation systems. After excusing the jury, Judge Timothy Hanson listened to Dr. Barbuto 
for a half hour as Dr. Barbuto explained his incredible and unfounded opinion that because there 
were fewer patients with chronic medical problems in Greece and Lithuania, and because these 
countries did not have a compensation system based on fault, therefore America's compensation 
system is to blame for not only Mrs. Fidel's chronic problems, but for nearly all patients with 
chronic problems. Understandably, Judge Hanson tlirew out all of this testimony. See copies of 
the pertinent part of the trial transcript, pp. 34-54, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit; see also ^ 9 
of Affidavit. 
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12. Importantly, Dr. Barbuto has admitted that he annually performed on the average 
approximately 200 IME's for the defense, making approximately $300,000 per year, but only did 
one or two for the plaintiffs side, one being for his brother-in-law, an attorney who asked Dr. 
Barbuto to do an IME but Dr. Barbuto never testified because his opinions were against the 
plaintiff. UK 10. 
13. Dr. Barbuto is notorious for his strongly biased opinions that the pain and other 
problems resulting from any trauma at issue were not caused from the trauma but originated 
from some psychological or secondary gain origin. Plaintiffs counsel has seen compilations of 
scores and scores of his defense medical examinations which all say nearly the same thing. Dr. 
Barbuto seldom, if ever, recognizes the trauma as the cause of the chronic problems, and nearly 
always suggests conscious or unconscious feigning or malingering (secondary gain). Id. ^ 11. 
14. Dr. Barbuto has publicly expressed his outrage regarding plaintiff attorneys who 
try to establish his bias and has specifically denounced a seminar that Mr. Humpherys presented 
to the plaintiffs bar regarding Dr. Barbuto's bias and willingness to give extreme defense 
opinions to endear himself with the defense bar, the source of most of his income. See f 12 of 
Affidavit. 
15. Plaintiff took Dr. Barbuto's deposition yesterday (September 30, 2003). Dr. 
Barbuto confirmed: 
a. That he had no release from plaintiff to discuss his medical treatment with 
opposing counsel. Rough draft of his deposition, pp. 75-77, attached as Exhibit 6. 
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b. That he had been asked on May 23, 2003 if defense counsel could retain 
him at $315 per hour to review information and render expert opinions. See 
letters between defense counsel and Dr. Barbuto, dated May 23, 2003, attached 
hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. 
c. On August 1, 2003 (a day after discovery cut-off), defense counsel sent 
extensive records to Dr. Barbuto and provided other information, asking him to 
address various records, and concluded in the letter, "After you have a chance to 
review his records give me a call so we can discuss your opinions. There are 
several issues we would like you to address but we can talk about those when you 
call." See letter of August 1, 2003, attached as Exhibit 4. 
d. On August 11, 2003, Dr. Barbuto prepared a ten page written report. He 
contacted defense counsel and discussed his report and the other issues raised by 
defense counsel. Defense counsel told him not to send his report to them. See 
Report of August 11, 2003, attached as Exhibit 5, and p. 71 of the rough draft of 
his deposition attached as Exhibit 6. 
e. Dr. Barbuto met with defense counsel for a couple of hours on September 
16, 2003 and discussed Dr. Barbuto's opinions at length. See Dr. Barbuto's 
billing statement, attached as Exhibit 7, and the rough draft of his deposition, p. 
72, Exh. 6. 
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f. When plaintiffs counsel called toward the end of September to make an 
appointment with Dr. Barbuto, he immediately called defense counsel to tell them 
plaintiffs counsel was meeting with him, p. 73, Exh. 6. 
g. Dr. Barbuto admits that he never tried to let plaintiff and plaintiffs 
counsel know of his involvement with defense counsel. See pp. 77-81, Exh. 6. 
h. Dr. Barbuto freely admits that he has now changed his opinion as to the 
cause of plaintiff s seizures, and that his prior opinions created a "mythology" 
about the cause of the seizures. See p. 23, Exh. 6. 
ARGUMENT 
L DR. BARBUTO'S TESTIMONY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN ITS ENTIRETY 
AND ONLY HIS MEDICAL RECORDS SHOULD BE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
Dr. Barbuto's proposed testimony is fundamentally flawed and results in irreparable 
prejudice and damage to plaintiffs case. Once Dr. Barbuto, a doctor widely known for catering 
to the defense bar and for his extreme defense bias, has been retained ex parte by defense 
counsel, his testimony as a treating physician is fundamentally flawed. Merely restricting his 
testimony to his historical treatment cannot overcome this flaw and prejudice. He cannot undo 
all of his ex parte contact or his review of large quantities of new information and the loyalty that 
is associated with being retained by defense counsel (as evidence in part by his refusal to provide 
plaintiffs counsel with his report, notes and other work product without defense counsel's 
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approval). Any explanation of his records will be colored now through the improper tainting by 
defendants' conduct. 
Restricting Dr. Barbuto's testimony will be ineffective to avoid the prejudice. In fact, it 
will cause additional prejudice since such restriction will preclude plaintiff from being able to 
demonstrate Dr. Barbuto's extreme defense biases and his illegal ex parte contact with opposing 
counsel. Instead, defendants would be able to perpetrate the myth that Dr. Barbuto is simply a 
treating physician being fully candid and honest with the jury. This would result in the ultimate 
damage to plaintiffs case, and would preclude plaintiff from having any means to present the 
true picture. 
The exclusion of his testimony is further warranted by defense counsel's failure to 
disclose the ex parte contact, failure to disclose Dr. Barbuto's report, and in fact, taking 
affirmative actions to avoid disclosure, contrary to Rule 26(a)(3)(4) and 26(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 26, requiring disclosure, is based upon the fundamental concept that 
justice is best advanced by open disclosure between the parties, including expert opinions. This 
concept is even more true when the defense has surreptitiously retained plaintiffs treating 
physician. But for pure happenstance, plaintiffs counsel would have never known about all of 
this until Dr. Barbuto was on the witness stand. 
Rule 37 (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the exclusion of the expert when 
proper disclosure is not made; 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required... that 
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any 
hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
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for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may 
order any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, 
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of 
the failure to disclose. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Advisory Notes to Rule 26 on the subject state as follows: 
The rule changes are intended to simplify discovery and promote full disclosure 
of discoverable information. 
* * * 
If a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to 
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless 
or there is good cause for the failure. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The facts clearly portray a situation where defense counsel was attempting to engage in 
trial by ambush, the very thing Rule 26 was designed to prevent. Moreover, this was not 
regarding a peripheral issue of small import. On the contrary, Dr. Barbuto's testimony goes to 
the very heart of plaintiff s damage case, i.e., that plaintiffs uncontested brain injury has resulted 
in little damage, and most, if not all, of the problems he is experiencing can be related to some 
psychiatric disorder that pre-existed the injury. Not even defendants' neuropsychologist, Dr. 
David Weight, supports the extreme position that Dr. Barbuto has now taken. Dr. Barbuto is 
even so bold as to discard his treating opinions which were reported to the referring physician 
and for which he billed the plaintiff. 
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Apart from the propriety of defense counsel's actions, Dr. Barbuto clearly violated the 
law in his ex parte communications with defense counsel. In the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (commonly referred to as "HIPAA"), health providers are expressly 
precluded from disclosing information about their patient unless such disclosure is "pursuant and 
in compliance with a consent that complies with § 164.506..." 45 CFR 164.502 (a)(l)(ii). The 
Act further states that a provider "may not use or disclose protected health information without 
an authorization that is valid under the section." 45 CFR 164.508. The Act gives specific 
requirements before any authorization to disclose such confidential information is valid. Id., § 
164.508(c). Neither Dr. Barbuto nor defense counsel had any release, let alone a "HIPAA" 
release. 
The Act has some exceptions to the requirement of a HIPAA release before disclosures, 
however, under those exceptions, which don't apply, disclosure is subject to a condition, 
"provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use or disclosure and has the 
opportunity to agree to or prohibit or restrict the disclosure in accordance with the applicable 
requirements of this section." 45 CFR 164.510. No notice was given by Dr. Barbuto or defense 
counsel of their use of this confidential information to either plaintiff, his guardians, or plaintiffs 
counsel. 
The Act specifically addresses disclosure of the confidential information injudicial 
proceedings. Such disclosure is allowed by court order or 
in response to a subpoena, discovery request or other lawful process, that is not 
accompanied by an order of the court.. .if: 
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(A) the [provider] receives satisfactory assurance.. .from the party seeking 
the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to 
ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected health 
information that has been requested has been given notice of the request; 
or 
(B) the [provider] receives satisfactory assurance.. .from the party seeking 
the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to 
secure a qualified protective order that meets the requirements of (e)(l)(v) 
of this section. 
45CFR 164.112(e)(l)(ii). 
The Act further gives other qualifications to the use of such protected information in 
judicial proceedings, all of which are conditioned upon notice to the patient. Defense counsel's 
ex parte contact with Dr. Barbuto has clearly violated HIP AA law, which is consistent with Rule 
26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring up front and forthright disclosures. Defense 
counsel made no effort to disclose the ex parte contact, together with their retention of Dr. 
Barbuto as a defense expert, even though plaintiffs attorney two weeks before trial had 
specifically asked about any ex parte contact. Except by pure happenstance, plaintiffs counsel 
would have never known about this ex parte involvement until trial when Dr. Barbuto would be 
testifying. 
The waiver of any doctor/patient privilege does not justify this surreptitious ex parte 
involvement. The puipose of a privilege is to require the nondisclosure of privileged infomiation 
when subpoenaed or otherwise required to testify. A waiver of a privilege does not constitute a 
waiver of all rights of privacy and confidentiality and the HIPAA laws, thus allowing a doctor to 
talk with anyone about his patient and to even hold himself out for hire against his patient. There 
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remains a common law right of privacy and confidentiality, which would require at least a court 
proceeding, such as a deposition, a subpoena, and proper notice to the patient and his attorney, 
before a doctor voluntarily and for hire, addresses his patient's medical affairs. 
Apart from the issue of disclosure, Dr. Barbuto's new opinions were not formulated until 
this past summer, and his report was not even requested nor written until August 11, 2003, long 
after the discovery cut-off dates. In fact, at the pre-trial on May 23, 2003, the parties represented 
that there was only a little discovery left and the Court opened discovery for the limited purpose 
of allowing defendants to have an economic expert, whose report was to be filed by the end of 
June and to allow a third deposition of the plaintiff. 
Having discovered all of this twelve days before trial, and deposing Dr. Barbuto one 
week before trial, does not resolve the severe prejudice to plaintiff. Dr. Barbuto refused to 
provide plaintiffs counsel with his reports and other work product regarding his retention by 
defense counsel until his deposition which gives plaintiffs counsel no time to prepare or be able 
to respond with appropriate medical testimony at trial. When added to the fact that plaintiff did 
not even discover this until approximately twelve days before trial, together with the calculated 
and conscious effort to surreptitiously and illegally build evidence through a treating physician 
who is a well-recognized defense biased doctor, requires the exclusion of his entire testimony. 
Since Dr. Barbuto's treating records, which contain Dr. Barbuto's numerous narrative reports, 
are fully available for use at trial, the exclusion of his testimony will result in no prejudice to the 
defendants, exclusion is the only appropriate remedy. Dr. Barbuto's numerous reports to 
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plaintiffs primary treating physician adequately sets forth Dr. Barbuto's opinions and treatment 
at the time. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must exclude Dr. Barbuto's testimony in total. There is no other way to avoid 
the unjust and serious harm to plaintiff, and the unfair advantage to defendants. The relevant 
information about Dr. Barbuto's treatment and opinions is adequately evidenced through his 
medical records and reports. 
DATED this . / ^ i day of October, 2003. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
yyt-'Rich Humpherys / ' ' y 7 7 
Attorneys for Plaintiff // 1/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the /^"day of October, 2003, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DR. JOHN P. 
BARBUTO was sent by the method indicated below to the following: 
Tim Dalton Dunn HAND DELIVERED 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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Neurology In Focus 
An Outpatient Neurology Clinic at HealthSouth 8074 South 1300 East, Sandy, UT 84094 
John P. Barbuto, MD Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 565-6774 
Diagnostic evaluation. Neurological testing (EEGy EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention 
5/23/03 
Kay Hanson, CLAS 
Dunn & Dunn 
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, U T 84102 
Re: Appearance at Sorsensen v. Marcelis trial 
Dear Ms. Hanson, 
We have received the notice of trial in the case of Nicholas Sorensen. As you 
know, there can be one "sticky" point which must be resolved prior to appearance. 
This is the issue of fees. I would like to presume that you expect to compensate me 
for my appearance at my normal fees ($315.00 per hour, including travel and court 
preparation). However, it is often unwise to make presumptions. So, I would like to 
clarify this. As you probably know, I see many patients with legal issues in the 
background. It is not possible to simply appear as a courtesy. 
As you know, technically I can be commanded to appear as a witness of fact. 
The courts recognize that court appearance is a hardship and I have not personally 
experienced a situation where it was expected that the doctor would do this for free 
(or for the standard $18.50 service fee). However, the law does allow for such 
command appearance. As a witness of fact I could be commanded to appear; but 
then I would not prepare. I would not offer expert opinion. I would only restate 
what is in the records. 
Alternatively, the usual situation is that appearance is as an expert. Such service 
would be charged as noted above. 
Just to clarify the issue, please advise me which way you are asking for my 
appearance. Again, I wish I could simply make the presumption that you are 
proceeding under the usual procedure (appearance as an expert). However, I don't 
like to make presumption in issues of this type. 
Sincerely, 
JohnP.Barfc%o,MD 
Out of Illness. Into l i f e 1 
DUNN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation T R I A L L A W Y E R S 
MIOTOWN PLAZA, SUITE 460 TIM DALTON DUNN T 
230 SOUTH 500 BAST SUSAN BLACK DUNN 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH S4102 ROBERT C. MOKTON * 
(801) 521-6677 PHONE CLIFFORD C- ROSS 
(801) 521 -6666 PHONE PAUL J. SIMONTSON 
(888) DUNNLAW MAKJCA. RjocHOFft 
(801) 521-9998 FAX STEPHEN D. ALD£RMAN-
4 . _,, „ STEPHANIE J. HOGCAN 
I Also AtifrtidcdlnHnwan 
• Ateo Adnuncd la Wytmwng 
f t AIM Attained m California 
" Also Admiucd In TCXAJ 
May 23, 2003 
VIA FACSIMILE (801) 565-6774 
Dr. John Barbuto 
Health South Rehabilitation Hospital 
8074 South 1300 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Re: S orensen v. Marcelis 
Claim No.: 07A992060405 
Our File No.: 00D-3860 
Dear Dr. Barburto: 
This letter comes in response to your letter dated May 23,2003. ^P^^tPWI^J&Spi* 
^^S^S^^^^^^^^^^m^ioT your appearance at trial in the above referenced matter. In 
fact, we wonder if you would be willing to spend several hours (approximately 5) and review all 
of Nicholas Sorensen records. We would like to know what you think, as his treating physician 
early on in his injury, about his cuiTent condition. Let us know and we will see if our client will 
authorize something like that. 
As you know, pursuant to our telephone call to your office yesterday, the trial that was 
scheduled to begin on May 28th has been continued. The trial is now scheduled for October 
(second place setting) or January, 2003 (first place setting). Accordingly, we will not need you to 
testify at this time. We will keep in touch with regard to when the next trial will begin. 
Let us know if you would review Mr. Sorensen's records for us. If you have any 
questions, don't hesitate to contact me. 
Yours truly, 
DUNN^DUNN,P.C-
^ D m N S O N , CLAS 
Certified Legal Assistant 
KH/ 
Neurology In Focus 
An Outpatient Neurology Clinic at HealthSoutb 8074 South 1300 East, Sandy, UT 84094 
John P. Barbuto, MD Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 565-6774 
Diagnostic evaluation, Neurological testing (EEG, EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention 
5/23/03 
Kay Hanson, CLAS 
Dunn & Dunn 
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Appearance at Sorsensen v. Marcelis trial 
Dear Ms. Hanson, 
Thank you for your letter and clarification. Yes, I would be happy to review 
the rest of Mr. Sorensen's records and include this in the overall assessment of his 
illness. It is always a pleasure to see "the rest of the story" from which maximum 
insight may be obtained. 
Sincerely, 
John P. Barbuf:^, M D 
Out of Illness, Into Life 1 
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August 1,2003 
Dr. John Barbuto 
Health South Rehabilitation Hospital 
8074 South 1300 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Re: Sorensen v. Marcelis 
Claim No.: 07A992060405 
Our File No.: 00D-3860 
Dear Dr. Barburto: 
Enclosed please find copies of Nicholas Sorensen's medical records in the above 
referenced matter. You treated Mr. Sorensen following an automobile accident on July 24, 1999. 
about a couple of 
"things. TEe following is somFiinoi^^ Mr. Sorensen 
since you last saw him. 
Mr. Sorensen received cognitive rehabilitation from HealthSouth until December of 1999. 
The last report from Eileen Paul, which was sent to you, indicated that he showed "significant 
improvement". Mr. Sorensen received no additional cognitive rehabilitation until February of 
2003. During that period Mr. Sorensen started college and held down a full time job, 
successfully. 
We have discovered that, prior to the accident of 07/24/99, Mr. Sorensen had a history of 
depression and uncontrolled temper. He also has a history of suicide threats, prior to the accident 
and since the accident. These suicide threats seem to be tied to breakups with girlfriends. You 
will also note that Dr. Bigler has recommended that Mr. Sorensen see a psychiatrist on several 
occasions and he has never seen a counselor of any kind except after he checked himself into the 
hospital because he felt like he was going to hurt himself and then only briefly. 
Mr. Sorensen did receive a brain injury as a result of this accident. The question we have 
is to what degree his current issues are as a result of the injury and what those issues might be as 
a result of problems Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident. 
I have also enclosed a medical chronology of Mr. Sorensen's care. It is not complete, but 
it may be helpful in your review. 
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After you have a chance to review his records, give me a call so we can discuss your 
opinions about Mr. Sorensen's progress over the last several years. There are several issues we 
would like you to address but we can talk about those when you call. 
If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact me. 
Yours truly, 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 





An Outptticnt Ncuwhgy Clinic *tHemlthSouth 
John P. Barbuto, MD 
Neurology In Focus 
8074 Soutb 1300 But, Sandy, UT 84094 
Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 561-7323 
Dia&ostic evaluation, Neurobpcal testing (EEC, EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention 
8/11/03 
Kay Hanson, CLAS 
Dunn&Dunn 
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Nicholas Sorensen 
Dear Ms. Hanson, 
I have performed an independent medical record review on Mr. Sorsensen at 
your request While it is preferable to see the patient in person also, this is not always 
possible. Medical records are accepted as a representation of the patient's illness, and 
it is even recognised that details of the medical illness may be more accurately 
obtained from records than from the patient. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
evaluate the patient via the records. In the following review I have personally 
reviewed the records. 




















Steve Hunt, MD 








follow-up patient seen for right knee pain attributed to twisting while 
mowing lawn. There is reference to "happened 2 years ago". 
follow-up patient seen for sinus congestion and headaches and depression. 
follow-up patient seen for report of smashed right hand 10/97 and smashed 
again 1/98. Also evaluated for right knee problems and referred to 
orthopedics 
follow-up continuing problems with depression 
Lab normal cervical spine series 
Lab normal CT brain scan 
follow-up reports he was jumped by a gang. Seen for headache and 
dlzzines. Contusion found behind right ear. Reported to have 
concussion/contusion and depression. 
follow-up "still gets bad daily headache' 
fo!!cw-up 
Still moody. History of depression 
prior to accident. 
seen for reported 4-wheeler accident. Reports left arm and 
shoulder pain and numbness in 4th and 5th fingers. 
Evaluation of: Nicholas Sorsensen—1 
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7/24/1999 Tremonton City Evaluation One car rollover. Found lying next to car Bleeding. 
Ambulance Transported. GCS 14/15 (a second report, also EMS, reported 










































Evaluation Seen for accident. Noted to be confused. Abrasions of elbows.. 
knee, chest, scalp. 
Lab Chest x-ray: aspiration pneumonia and/or pulmonary contusion of 
right lung. Normal cervical and lumbosacral spine. 
Admission H&P Patient reported to have been a roll-over accident in which he 
was ejected. He was found to have a closed head injury and 
transferred from another hospital. Exam shows nose abrasions, 
multiple chest abrasions, multiple ecchymoses of abdomen, 
bilateral abrasions to lower extremities. No spine problems 
noted. Labs showed bilateral frontal lobe contusions, left worse 
than right, right occipital fracture. Chest x-ray shows right 
pulmonary contusion. WBC 20.8. Many other tests done and 
basically normal. 
Evaluation Patient seen for neurosurgical evaluation of bilateral frontal 
contusions and skull fracture. Patient reports thai he lost control 
of his vehicle, Exam: neurological noteable for GCS 15/15, 
retrograde and anterograde amnesia, other basically normal 
Prior history of another concusslve event one year prior. 
Discharge Hospitalization revealed good improvement. Patient continued to 
complain of headache. Plan for transfer to Alta View Hospital. 
progress note Patient apparently had "review" of potential for PTSD and advised 
to see Dr. Bigetow. 
Admission H&P Patient admitted for treatment. Reference to prior concussion one 
year prior "when a gang Jumped him and beat him up". "He even 
had to change schools and went through some traumatic 
episodes with that.*1 Exam notable for abrasions. Admit with 
diagnosis of cerebral concussion and bilateral contusions. 
progress note Patient noted to be awake, alert, cooperative, oriented and to 
have no motor or sensory deficits. DTR noted to be hyperactive 
but equal. 
Lab CT brain scan shows multiple areas of increased attenuation 
primarily In the frontal lobes and felt to be most likely representing 
small parenchymal hemorrhages. 
Evaluation Report of prior concussion with subsequent depression. 
Discussion of PTSD, concussion, and depression from current 
event 
progress note patient noted to be much improved and is discharged. 
Lab MRI of right knee shows media suprapatellar plica but otherwise 
normal knee, 
follow-up seen for follow-up of mva with reported significant head trauma. 
follow-up reports pinching in right knee and low back pain with radiation 
down the right leg. Background depression and concussion also 
noted. 
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10/26/1999 Reed Fogg, MD 
Evaluation patient seen for consultation for head Injury. Noted to have had 
evidence for possible skull fracture and frontal contusion. 
Background depression noted. Exam basically normal at bedside. 
Felt to have concussion and contusion with unclear role of 
background depression. 
Evaluation Patient has speech/language pathology evaluation. He Is noted 
to have some cognitive deficits primarily in learning and 
processing speed. 
Lab EEG: "overall tense with some mild dysrhythmia and questionable 
left occipital slowing." 
follow-up Patient presents reporting spells. No definite evidence of seizure 
activity, but also not excludable. Started on Depakote. 
Lab Lumbar CT scan shows focal small central and right 
posterolateral Grade 2 L5-S1 disc herniation that abuts both S1 
nerve roots, right greater than the left. Diffuse Grade 1 L4-5 disc 
bulge. 
Evaluation patient seen for his low back pain. He is said to have seizures 
and severe, disabling, back pain. Patient taking 4 psychoactive 
medications. Concluded to have "low back pain, rule out internal 
disc disruption, rule out chronic ligamentous and muscle Injury." 




11/16/1999 Reed Fogg, MD 





12/20/1999 Eileen Paul, MD 
3/9/2000 John Barbuto, 
MD 
3/20/2000 Kethy Alderson, 
MD 




8/2/2000 Terry Sawchuk, 
MD 
follow-up patient reports cessation of his seizure-tike spells since three 
days after starting Depakote. 
Lab Lumbar MRI shows grade 2 central to right disc protrusion at L5-
S1 and mild facet arthropathy at L4-5 and L5-S1. 
follow-up Scan findings are reviewed and It Is concluded that the patient 
may have an Internal disc disruption. Dr. Fogg advocates a 
conservative approach. Direct attribution to the auto accident is 
advocated. 
follow-up "At some point we may wonder whether the Depakote is helping 
him because it is treating seizures or because it is treating a 
mood disorder. However, for the time being we will assume it is 
treating seizures." 
Evaluation patient completes Intake forms for physical therapy. Patient has a 
brief course of therapy. 
follow-up patient completes cognitive therapy (spanning from 8-13 to this 
date). Patient said to have had significant improvement in all 
areas. 
follow-up Letter to patient regarding the status of his claims and plans. 
[See letter for details.] 
Lab EEG normal. 
follow-up T w o normal EEG's. Can't prove seizure." 
Lab lumbar discography; L4-5 anatomically normal and no symptom 
production. L5-S1 injection produced his typical low back pain 
and annular cleft was observed with subllgamentous extrusion. 
Evaluation Patient is seen for his reported back and leg complaints. Five 
page report, In conclusion, IDET is advocated. 
Evaluation of: Nicholas Sorsensen—3 
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Evaluation patient seen for neuropsychological evaluation. "Results of 
intellectual assessment indicate level of function to be within the 
average range. No specific Intellectual deficit Is noted/ He Is 
noted to have significant levels of depression and anxiety. He is 
felt to have "classic post-concusslve syndrome" [except for the 
obvious issue that It is a year and a half after the concussion], 
EEG: low voltage fast pattern, some tension, one posterior spike 
noted. 
Patient seen for neurological evaluation. Noted to be e 19 year 
old full time college student at SLCC. Seen for evaluation of 
seizure disorder. Patient reports that "shortly after the accident 
Mr. Sorensen began experiencing partial seizures, which would 
occur approximately 8-10 times a day8 [Note: this is not an 
accurate history. Patient had seen me In 1999 with no mention at 
all of seizures. Later there were only questions In this regard. 
See conclusions.] Report Is 4 pages long. See for details. 
Based on what patient presents the history of seizures is 
presented as if established. 
follow-up In a letter to IHQ Health Plans Dr. Fogg discusses that "I 
recognize there is still some question as to the validity of an IDET 
procedure. However, I believe that Nicholas Sorensen would be 
much better served with an IDET than an anterior Interbody 
fusion* 
MRI of brain shows "findings are consistent with remote post 
traumatic changes. There are small hemorrhages and 
encephatomalacia at the frontal poles and left frontal convexity." 
Lumbar MRI: grade 1-2 posterior central disc protrusion. 
Patient admitted for treatment of lumbar herniated disc. Patient 
taking Depakote, Effexor, Trazodone, Celebrex. Admitted for 
IDET procedure, which occurs on this date. 
patient seen for another brief course of physical therapy. 
24 hour ambulatory EEG shows normal background activity. 
Patient reports various behavioral disturbances. Report 
concludes "normal 24 hour ambulatory EEG with no correlation 
between EEG and symptoms Including 'shut down feeling*". 
patient seen for tremor. He Is felt to have an essential tremor. 
possibly aggravated by Effexor and Depakote. 
Patient seen for depression. He asserts that Hnobody take my 
headaches seriously*1. He asserts that he Is "stressed out" about 
life. Patient felt to have a mood disorder and psychiatric care is 
arranged. 
Patient seen In ER for "complains of two personalities, feeling of 
losing control". Reportedly having suicidal thoughts. Reports 
chronic headaches in background. Also reports prior head 
trauma and seizures. Meds: Depakote, Effexor Trazodone: Paxil. 
2/27/2002 George Admission H&P 
Nlkopoulos, MD 
patient admitted for suicidal behavior. He is concluded to have 
meu'or depression. 
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Discharge Patient discharged from LDS hospital whore he was admitted for 
depression. 
Evaluation Neuropsychological evaluation. 15 page report. Overall patient's 
Intellectual function Is determined to be in the normal range. He 
Is noted to have had objective Injury in the Index accident. And, 
he Is noted to have had pre-accident depression. 
5/30/2002 Michael follow-up patient seen for spells. "I reviewed the situation with Nicholas 
Goldstein, MD and his father. I explained to them the executive function deficits 
and impulse control problems he was having are related to his 
brain injury. I recommended that they keep in close contact with 
the psychiatrist and counselor to determine what medications 
would be best for this." [Considering the recommendation for 
psychiatric treatment and the prior psychiatric care how can one 
be sure this Is injury and not psychiatric illness?} 




Evaluation Patient is seen for speech-language pathology evaluation. 
Patient gives history of a 3.9 GPA In high school at A's and B's at 
SLCC. He claims reduced academic load due to fatigue. He 
obtained social dispensations for classwork. His various claims of 
symptoms and conditions are discussed. He has cognitive testing 
which is reported to show various deficits. [Note: the studies list 
his apparent state of function, but the report does not provide 
conclusions as to what caused that state of function (which, l 
would argue, is appropriate).] 
lab patient has Epstein-Barr titers which are high, both IgG and IgM. 
Impressions and Conclusions: 
Mi. Sorensen presents a particularly interesting and complicated situation. In 
the final analysis it is my opinion that his condition is best understood using a 
biopsychosodal model of analysis. And, all three elements (biological, psychological, 
and social) are seemingly quite important 
On 7/24/99 the patient was involved in an accident In the review of the 
records of the event it is noted that the patient was involved in a single-car rollover. 
The patient asserts that the accident happened because the driver lost control of the 
car. 
At first blush the initial perspective is that Nicholas was cleady injured in the 
accident. He was admitted to the hospital with bilateral frontal brain contusions, a 
probable lung contusion and multiple abrasions. There is also a history of lumbar 
disc protrusion which does seem reasonably related to the accident 
The frontal brain contusions are unquestionably related to the accident The 
brain contusions were followed initially by prompt improvement, in a fashion quite 
compatible with actual injury. Within days his clinical function was basically normal. 
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However, the long term story of his brain function requires a more complex analysis 
(as discussed below). 
The lung contusion was also unquestionably related to the accident This 
problem cleared quickly. 
Multiple abrasions were also unquestionably related to the accident However, 
these were basically minor, and also cleared quickly. 
The lumbar disc protrusion is probably also related to the accident The disc 
bulge was not dramatic. However, he was only 18 at the time and a lumbar disc bulge 
would be uncommon at that age. In addition, while not immediately, it was only a 
few days after the accident when he complained of the low back and right leg 
problems. Given the presence of the other, more critical, and obscuring, issues it 
seems prudent to disregard the fact that lumbar and right leg complaints were not 
immediate. 
Therefore, the first perspective is that he was injured. I'll say more about this 
below. 
Yet, the second perspective is that he has improved much more poorly than the 
degree of his objective findings would have predicted, particularly at his age. The 
failure to follow a normal graph of healing suggests that psychosocial factors may be 
at play. Indeed, he had an underlying depressive disorder. Further, much of his care 
subsequent to this accident has centered on subjective complaint and on clearly 
psychiatric issues. So, there is a second story which is his psychiatric story. 
Third, there probably is a significant contribution from the social 
circumstances. Even in spite of his psychiatric history there are features which 
suggest that the social context is acting as a fomenting influence. 
To me this patient is particularly fascinating because it appears that he has a 
mythology of purported seizures which I inadvertently set in motion. I saw the 
patient about 10 days after this accident At that time he had no history suggesting 
any seizure activity. However, because of his documented contusion I thought it wise 
to do an EEG to see if there was any subclinical seizure activity. His EEG ended up 
showing some minor dysrhythmia, maybe of the type often seen in psychiatric 
patients (an interesting side discussion). When these results returned I told the patient 
about the results, and probably said something to the extent that the EEG was not 
exactly normal but did not look like seizures. At that moment I may have planted the 
seed. The patient then later returned with the "evolved" claim of spells. Given the 
claim and the presence of the prior contusion I had little choice but to proceed with 
the possibility of seizures and I prescribed Depakote. However, I noted at that time 
that there was no solid evidence of seizures. Reportedly due to insurance change, the 
patient stopped seeing me shortly thereafter. Now, years later, it becomes apparent 
that this beginning seemingly set in motion a mythology—the mythology that he has a 
seizure disorder. When he saw Dr. Goldstein in 2001 he then presented the history 
that he began experiencing partial seizures numerous times a day shortly after the 
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accident and that I had started him on Depakote as if seizures were confirmed. In 
spite of the patient's claim of spells up to many times a day, his subsequent EEG's 
(including an ambulatory 24 hour EEG) have not shown definitive epileptiform 
activity. He has continued Depakote but there has not been confirmation of the 
presence of seizures, Depakote is also used routinely in mood disorders. While the 
possibility of seizures most clearly exists in a patient who has had brain contusions. 
The actual presence of seizures has not been confirmed. In addition, the 24 hour 
ambulatory EEG commented directly on the lack of correlation between his claimed 
spells and any evidence for actual seizure discharge. 
So the analysis of this young man requires, in my opinion, recognition of all 
three major components: biological, psychological, and social, ** In a situation of this 
type, with clear brain injury, the resolution of the contribution from the various 
components may become a daunting task. I do not claim to have a crystal ball. 
However, FU do the best I can here to segregate the issues. 
Let us consider the issue of brain injury first There is no question that brain 
injury occurred. Further, there is no question that brain injury may have impact on 
psychological function. Therefore, reasonable consideration of a role for the accident 
in both structural issues and psychological issues is required. Based on the scan 
findings and his prompt improvement when hospitalized acutely it would be predicted 
that he would have good resolution of this component of his syndrome. (Indeed, that 
was my prediction when I first saw him only a few days after the event) And, he did 
indeed improve promptly during the early course. However, lurking in the 
background were both psychological and social issues. Unfortunately, it appears these 
conspired to preclude the prompt resolution which his initial findings would have 
predicted- Note in this regard that later testing of his cognitive function showed 
dysfunctions which were non-spedfic, and of types which may easily be seen in 
depression and/or anxiety. Both Dr. Bigler and Dr. Weight, for example, found that 
his intellect was basically normal. Brain scans did reveal some residual findings, but 
these were not large. Similar degrees of abnormality may be found in patients with no 
clinical abnormalities. 
He had underlying psychiatric illness and then he had frontal lobe injury. So, 
one question we must examine is the impact of frontal lobe injury on behavioral state. 
This can take us back to the famous case of Phineas Gage, who, via an unintended 
frontal lobotomy from brain penetration by a tamping rod, showed us the potentials 
for behavioral change which may occur from frontal lobe problems. To be sure, 
invoking such issues as directly pertinent to Mr. Sorensen would be hyperbole. 
However, the concept of behavior change from frontal lobe injury can be relevant. 
So, we then must ponder whether his frontal lobe injury was truly contributory to his 
later behavioral dysfunction. While the discussion can be lengthy, I would summarize 
that I don't think his degree of frontal lobe injury had any notable long term 
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behavioral consequence. Rather, it seems to me more probable that his behavioral 
problems were simply further manifestations of his underlying psychiatric illness. 
Depressive disorders commonly begin to manifest in the late teenage years. 
Typically they progressively worsen during the 20*8 and 30*8 under the influence of 
increasing life stresses. From actual injury, particularly of the degree he suffered, 
suicidal ideation would be very anomalous. However, from depressive disorders this 
may develop. I think the clear issues of suicidal ideation stand as additional support 
that his behavioral disturbance was a mood disorder rather than a frontal lobe brain 
injury consequence, 
Summarizing, I think he did have a brain injury and short term it was clearly an 
issue. However, long term it appears his depressive disorder is much more relevant to 
his behavioral and cognitive issues. 
The next issue is the question of seizures. This is largely discussed above. To 
summarize, I don't think time and subsequent testing has confirmed any seizure 
disorder. 
The next Issue is the lung contusion. This resolved promptly. 
The next issue is the multiple abrasions. These also resolved promptly. 
The next issue is the lumbar disc disease. I do think this needs to be related to 
the auto accident However, we do have a confounding factor. Many, many patients 
with chronic stress biology will manifest back pain complaints which are ultimately a 
derivative primarily of chronic stress-induced muscle spasm. Not only does this mean 
that the mechanisms involved may be mixed issues (disc plus spasm, for instance) but 
it also means that persisting problems may be more related to the stress than to the 
disc. Further, patients with primarily stress mechanisms tend to fail surgery (when 
someone docs this chasing a modest disc bulge). In the case of Mr. Sorensen we note 
that his disc bulge was not dramatic. It does appear from the discogram that the 
bulged disc was a source for his pain. The records do not make it clear if his IDET 
worked or not. At this point I would suggest that the disc bulge, early back care, and 
the IDET should be related to the auto accident However, if he did poorly after the 
IDET then we need to give consideration to recognizing that surgical failure and long 
term complaint may be related to his undedying stress and depressive illness rather 
than to the accident. 
I believe the above answers the questions you posed. 
Sincerely, 
John P. Barbuto, MD 
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 The BioPsychoSociftl Model of Analysis: 
The biopsychosocifll model of analysis is particularly appropriate many poorly explained, yet chronic, 
syndromes, parnctdarly those which are alio poorly responsive to medical treatment The model acknowledges the large 
and expanding body of literature identifying that biological elements, psychological elements, and social dements may all 
contribute importantly to such syndromes. Treatment failure is often best explained by recognition that social and 
psychological issues may make illness self-propagating, and claim of illness even advantageous. The biopsychosocial 
model was proposed by Geotgc Engel in 1977 as a replacement fbt the old "organic versus nonorganic" dichotomy 
which is routinely neither accurate nor sufficient at an analysis paradigm for complex syndromes of these types. There 
arc now on the order of 1200 peer-reviewed articles referenced m Medline which discuss the subject from one 
perspective or another Over 200 of these focus on chrome pain syndromes. In addition there ate perhaps many times 
this many published editorials or other non-Medkne discussions which reference this concept The AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment has also referenced this discussion in its consideration of chronic pain 
In the biopsychosocial syndrome it is typical for psychiatric or social mechanisms to be predominant Yet, the 
patient may strongly deny these issues The patient may become quite angry when such issues are discussed 
Overstatement of a claim of injury, m particular, has become a route for these patients to serve many hidden social and 
psychiatric agendas 
Another issue common to the biopsychosodal syndrome is excessive support of an biological (particukry 
injury) hypothesis by providers or others who may stand to benefit from economic opportunities these patients provide 
These patients, driven by their psychological issues and/or social needs, may volunteer for grossly excessive medical 
care and other services, A minor "fender-bender'* for example, may be driven to an opportunity for many years of 
services While most providers do not seek an inappropriate relationship to these patient*, there are a small number of 
providers who may exploit these patients Highly invested participants may become very vociferous in objection to 
discussion of the actual issues. 
In the biopsychosoaal syndrome the patient may ultimately become the victim the services provided- An 
objectively minor accident, for example, may be fostered into a multryear illness—one m which there is grossly 
excessive medical care, poor response to treatment, iatrogenic worsening via excessive belief in illness and consequences 
of unnecessary mvasive treatment. The biopsychosocial syndrome patient may become emotionally and physically more 
dysfunctional over time The patient may ultimately become "a wreck"—not due to the original event, but due to the 
excessive utility of ovetstaang the hypothesis of biological illness (particularly injury) The ultimate utility of 
understanding the biopsychosoaal model is greatly more accurate and effective patient care 
* The Need to Hypothesize* 
The court systems understandably prefer not to hypothesize. However, in the biopsychosocial patient 
hypothesis is basically unavoidable Characteristically in these patients there is a large disparity between sohdly 
objectively findings (for example, by the laboratory) versus symptom claims being made. Therefore, we may need to 
hypothesise what wc think accounts for the disparity 
Commonly providers attempt to explain the biopsychosoaal syndrome patient by some hypothesis which 
presumes an occult biological process Labels such as "sprain", "strain", "soft tissue injury", or "post concussion 
syndrome" ate often invoked. Yet, while such hypotheses might, at first blush, %ccm reasonable, the course of the illness 
reveals that the syndrome is excessive for any reasonable use of such terms. In the biopsychosocial patient it is common 
for minor versions of these processes to be present at the beginning of the syndrome, but as time proceeds these resolve 
and become replaced by psychosocial dynamics Typically this transiuon occurs in the first few weeks of the churned 
illness 
In some of these patients there arc no objective findings The entire claim of the illness proceeds on subjective 
complaints. In othet patients minor injury is proven but it b minor, and not a reasonable explanaaon for the subsequent 
excessive syndrome And, in a few there is clear and significant injury, yet, there is a subsequent syndrome which 
exceeds what even this would reasonably predict. We may, to a reasonable extent, allow ourselves to hypothesize some 
kind of injury mechanism; however, in these patients psychological or social mechanisms often provide a much more 
logical way to explain the disparity between major claims and minimal test findings. 
Since we have a poor ability to test for stress illness, psychiatric illness, and hidden social agendas we have a 
limited ability to prove absolutely when these are present Therefore, we have a limited ability to prove mat these are the 
cause for the disparity between the patient's few abnormal tests and the extensive syndrome claimed. Yet, it is actually 
bias or prejudice to discount psychological or social mechanisms and presume injury. To do so may not only be 
inappropriate in resolution of social contingencies, tt may slso encmirflge the patient to remain ill and to receive ill-
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conceived medical care, la these patknta we may need to hypothetic which specific psychological or social issues are 
present (because the laboratory cannot confirm our hypothesis) but psychosocial dynamics routinely make far greater 
sense than an injury hypothesis. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




JACK W. MARCELIS, MICHELLE 
MARCELIS and SEAN MARCELIS, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF: 
JOHN P. BARBUTO, MD 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 JOHN P . BARBUTO, MD, 
3 called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
4 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
5 follows: 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. HUMPHERYS: 
8 Q Would you state your full name, please? 
9 A John Patrick Barbuto. 
10 Q Your occupation? 
11 A I'm a neurologist. 
12 Q Did you have the occasion at one point in time 
13 to treat a patient by the name of Nicholas Sorensen? 
14 A I did. 
15 Q And what was the time period in which you 
16 treated him, beginning and ending date? 
17 A I first saw Nicholas on August 4th of 1999 and 
18 the last visit appears to be 2/13/01. 
19 Q Other than responding to subpoenas, did you 
20 have any further involvement with this case until May 
21 of 2 003 when you were subpoenaed to go to trial and 
22 there was some communications with Dunn & Dunn? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Before we get into anything more, let me mark 
25 some exhibits and we can get those identified and 
3 
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1 squared away before we move into the other areas. 
2 MR. HUMPHERYS: Would you mark that as 
3 Exhibit 1, please. 
4 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
5 identification.) 
6 Q Doctor, I'm going to show you what's been 
7 marked Exhibit 1. Just thumb through that and make 
8 sure these all appear to be records or copies of 
9 records from your file. Not that that is complete, but 
10 that everything in Exhibit 1 are records from your 
11 file. 
12 MR. HUMPHERYS: Will you mark this as No. 2, 
13 please. 
14 (Whereupon, Exhibit Nos. 2 through 5 were 
15 marked for identification.) 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, it appears these are all 
17 from my file. There are a few letters in here from 
18 insurance companies and things, and it looks like those 
19 are letters that were either to me or from my file, but 
20 without actually looking at those letters I can't tell 
21 they are actually my documents. I think they are, but 
22 I'm not sure of that. Most of the records are my 
23 records, and those clearly are from my file. 
24 Q With the exception of the letters either to or 
25 from an insurance company? 
4 
1 A Yes, I think that's correct. There's a letter 
2 from Eileen Paul in there, that top one, which I know 
3 appears in my stuff someplace. And I think the rest of 
4 it, I can say for sure. It's only those ones where 
5 they're letters from insurance companies, and I don't 
6 know for sure they're in my file. I think they are 
7 because I gave you copies of my file the other day, so 
8 I think that's where you got them. 
9 Q Let me show you what's been marked as 
10 Exhibit 2, which are copies of. records we obtained from 
11 your file last Thursday when we met, I believe it was 
12 Thursday, and I just wanted to make sure those are also 
13 copies of records from your file. 
14 A I think all of these are except there's one of 
15 them I don't recognize, which is a letter dated 1/5/99 
16 from Nicholas Sorensen and it's to Safeco Insurance, 
17 and I don't -- that may be in my records, I just don't 
18 recognize it. 
19 Q All right. Why don't you check, because I 
20 believe we got it from your records. I was going to 
21 ask you where you got it, because it didn't seem like 
22 it was a letter that concerns you or was addressed to 
23 you. It's towards the bottom of your file I believe. 
24 A Let's go backwards, then. I'll go from the 
25 other end. 
5 
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1 Q There it is. 
2 A Here it is. 
3 Yes, it is in my file. 
4 Q Do you know where it came from? 
5 A No. Let me see if I can tell by where it is. 
6 Yes, it looks like this came with this letter 
7 here from Greg Hamblin from September 1st, 2000, from 
8 Allstate. There's a letter here from a Greg Hamblin 
9 who is a claims representative at Allstate, and it 
10 says --do you want me to read it? 
11 Q No, that's all right. 
12 A It looks like that's where this came from. 
13 Q Is that what it says or is that what you're 
14 assuming? 
15 A It says here, "In a letter written by Nicholas 
16 regarding his claim, he mentions you are treating him 
17 for a brain injury and subsequent seizures." And then 
18 there is this letter that is dated 1/5/99 by the 
19 patient, and there is a highlighted portion of it that 
20 says, "Dr. Barbuto who has been treating me for my 
21 brain damage. After the accident I was having seizures 
22 and he put me on Depakote." So it looks like this was 
23 probably sent as an attachment ot the letter from a 
24 Greg Hamblin. 
25 Q Okay. It doesn't look like it specifically 
1 referred to, but: there's some logical connection 
2 b e M - • 
3 A Yes, ti.at ' s one of the reasons I looked at 
4 where they we re ; :i the chart. Basically as stuff comes 
5 in, rr • * • *• ! ^  s <" it • • J s *• qf*- s pu t- i r chr- -nologica 1 
6 ord 
7 they yet copied, things can certainly get mixec, ..} 
8 But tst so happens it i,- u: i uxtaposi tioned > .. u s 
9 letter -*-"; * he i-#-t-, . • ,-f erencec tb it i-d Miat sec* ion 
10 O; l ' < •:. 'd, 
11' so presumably that's where it came from. 
12 _ All right . Fair enough. 
13 Now ----,-'-•' : .- -. -i .---.]'„• • •? been 
14 marked as i-.;--- -., ^n n & Dunn 
15 to you dated August j*. .  •• r. and rist nave you 
16 confirm that tli^: is also part of your records? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Ana ^.;._. _..,..... \ that you provided 
19 me today. Is this a oilliny to Turin & Dunn? 
20 1 v 
21 Q F 
22 A 
23 Q Does this comprise all of the billings you 
24 have si i bmitted to Dunn & Dunn? 
25 A Yes. 
7 
1 Q And there's currently an outstanding balance 
2 of $787.50? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Do you anticipate doing any additional work 
5 for Dunn & Dunn or any additional billing? 
6 A I suppose that depends upon what you guys do 
7 with this case. In other words, as you know, he did 
8 ask me to review the additional records, which are 
9 here, and then I did talk with him thereafter and 
10 that's reflected in the billing. And so if you guys 
11 are able to settle this thing, then the answer would be 
12 no. If that is not the case, then it is possible 
13 certainly that he would want to talk to me prior to 
14 trial, or you might even want to talk to me prior to 
15 trial, but certainly he may want to, and so I would 
16 presume that to be the case. 
17 Also, when we had our conversation the other 
18 day I mentioned to you that if there were additional 
19 data, such as prolonged EEGs, other kinds of things 
2 0 that would provide further data regarding this question 
21 of seizures and spells and what these spells are, if 
22 there were additional data of that type, then that may 
23 be relevant in the file sort of assessment of where we 
24 think we are with this. And if you or he would gather 
25 that information, then presumably that would come into 
8 
3 discussion also. 
1
 i I : i in terms of bei nq rranrrted, to do anything 
I IIHJII ,
 t ,. ..ave n o p r e s e n t n i r t •' ::hc t: :i : e g,= :i : d? 
'I /"i Correct I take that back. 
THE WITNESS: You've asked me to show up at 
MR ALDERMAN: Yes, we've sent you a ; i;> ua. 
THE WITNESS: So consequently .• have had t; at, 
wh i r b : - :> o re qu. est t o a p p e a r a t t r i a I. 
A nd h :i t d I: 5 appeai s to be a report 
dated August 
Correct. 
And it is ten pages long; is that correct? 
Now, does your report of August 1 1, '2 003, 
conta,;. yonr ci ir rent opinions? 
Y e s , I b e 1 i e v e i t d o e s I b e 1 i eve there h av e 
' •• * - i . a d d L I l u i i c i I i . l i i i in i I in i ii I In I  I in i i in i in in in I i in I i i i t 
• ;nr and so that contains the opinions I had as of the 
t. Line " *JI ..<(. :' ;es. 
Ha v i nn ------ received th i n i mmed lately be f c T~e 
ioi couple few paragraphs. Help me understand the 
maki- -:p of your report. r i rst paragraph obviously 
jrni this 
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1 independent medical record review. 
2 A Right. 
3 Q And then the next section is simply your notes 
4 from the records that you have reviewed? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q And you know of no other notes other than 
7 these typewritten notes that you have taken based on 
8 your record review? 
9 A That's correct. You know, when we were 
10 starting here at the beginning you mentioned you 
11 thought you saw some handwritten notes. It isn't my 
12 usual character to handwrite because my handwriting is 
13 not that great and I usually just work at the computer. 
14 So I don't -- I'm not aware of any handwritten notes. 
15 This is where I would normally put all of my stuff. 
16 Q And you would not keep any handwritten notes? 
17 A I would never have generated them. In other 
18 words, they would be -- when I'm going through records, 
19 I actually have my computer set up and I'm sitting just 
20 as this young lady is here typing into the computer. 
21 Q At the end you have end notes on pages 9 and 
22 10. 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Tell me what these are. 
25 A Basically those are some sort of broad 
10 
I discussions that are commonly relevant to these kinds 
•vas theit \. * . ; ' because 
A.i .;.,... . .. h-.: is a - - f ii. i. .. -jv. ;L!iient 
t :iat -ise to start with making my notes is a form, 
5 * ? M ( M- ' ^ ntains some places where I can put 
6 
7 iui vt.- r ,. , Jo record review:
 t ' tl: . . . 
8 contains, a-, i •:.•( u:. the basic structui* such as 
9 record rev Lew, i mpressions and conclusion, and ther e 
, < • » m i c I j,/!1!, i 1 11 i , t ..." • , • !,.". ," i n ' i i 
biopsychosocial model that come up i ecur lently, so I 
put those as footnotes and they are just in the for m 
and they happen to, then -- tiiey print at the end of 
the doci iment 
In this case where those footnotes reference 
is n. * lie second paragraph of page '•'. 
j All right *; 5 * v-: - is ri:np] y like the 
-- or is a foot 
To explain. 
paragraphs on page 7? 
• - '> g h t s oine o f t h e s e concepts and t h i nq s . 
; J - >w , i s t h :i : • - • o p s y c h o s c. >i: i a .1 itiod e I a 11 a 1 \ 11 i s 
something that you generated as it relates to Nick or 
is t:h:i s something that is qeneric? 
i • i I . i III )< in i mi1 ( , J in j i i j i in l 
1 model itself? 
2 Q I'm talking about footnote A. Was this 
3 generated specifically as it related to this matter or 
4 was it generated in some generic form that you just 
5 copied and pasted? 
6 A Right, thatfs just in the form as a generic 
7 thing about the biopsychosocial model, some of the 
8 background. That does not pertain specifically to 
9 Nick. 
10 Q I see. And tell me where the source of this 
11 information came from. 
12 A Well, I wrote it, and it is a sort of broad 
13 brush discussion of the biopsychosocial model and 
14 references some of the literature which is in the 
15 background for that, such as George Engel's stuff that 
16 was the original article in Science magazine and then 
17 some of the Medline references and that kind of thing 
18 that are discussed. And it talks about what are the 
19 elements of a biopsychosocial model and why do we use 
20 it. So it's a general perspective for people who are 
21 not familiar with the model. 
22 Q Tell me what article George Engel's -- or 
23 publication came from? 
24 A It appeared in Science in 1977, and I don't 
25 remember the exact title. It's something like 
I "Biopsychosocial Model, An Alternative to the 
' • r> ft r 
standard analysis 01 scirtuthmg e ii.igotten exa tly 
vhe t ••
 :e : r.i'*_ >' come place, \ -t guess I did; !t 
icti^'lv put thp specific footnote in heie. 1 do Lave 
1-
Any other paLi n-aL iuii3 except -- other thar; 
"he AMA. Guide that you are referring to '-ut r:,^  citing? 
1 Wei ' ar T --a id here, there ai" about 1,2C 
iook under biopsychosocia 1, that1 s goirig up fairly 
rapidly these days because there's actually a . r c 
•. t i c 11: s i K";V; t- - "•!- -
 :- * - • • • * • - * ' - - i s i n q f a i r ! * -
rap;; . : thei n a .r e 
relating to chronic pain syndromes. And there actually 
are nou n i- • -f articles talking about 'his -- the 
- • ^ :i; 1'- ' ' st- • ,- , I thin1. 
i_iuLJib^ " ii" v- a- a were I * : ilk 
three major articles on the biopsychosocial model , 
re1ationship to spine disorders, if I reca11 correctly. 
' - • se 
drtiCiL., . JVC L. JII.C ._•! them i .: .:., . ,,es 
someplace. I. have a whole box of files on pain 
" articles and various kinds of things like that and some 
1 Q Would the same discussion be true with your 
2 footnote B, that is, that it's a generic discussion? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q That isn't necessarily geared toward Nick? 
5 A Correct. In other words, it's -- well, it is 
6 only in the sense that I brought up in his context that 
7 the biopsychosocial model seems to be a useful model to 
8 invoke in analyzing his situation. And so in the broad 
9 sense that we often need to hypothesize in some of 
10 these -- because in some of these patients, and this is 
11 less true for Nick, but in some of these patients 
12 there's often not very much to work with that you can 
13 see on laboratory studies, so we end up, then, 
14 struggling under various kinds of hypothesized labels 
15 such as sprain or strain or that kind of thing. 
16 Now, in Nick that's less true, although there 
17 is this whole discussion of the seizure issues in him. 
18 And depending upon how we end up finally concluding on 
19 that, we can invoke more or less of the --of this 
20 discussion as it relates to him. 
21 So this is not -- this is what you would call 
22 boilerplate, meaning it's a general piece that's 
23 relevant to things, but it is not specifically relevant 
24 to him. It's not written for him. It's more of a 
25 background of how do we think about these things. 
14 
1 1 1 * -.• -' J .nii:!, t >^- pur pone • f "if i - beeaus e some 
2 of •
 ; . : :i i t 
3 from getting a framework to "understand how to think 
4 about these things. 
5 Q Now, goina bar!: into your report marked as 
6 Exh i b i t: 5 uncie • :i : t - • - • ag " M e d :i c a 1 R e cc i d s Re v i e w ' I 
7 need to ask you -- let's see, if you have -- I guess 
8 you don't: you car • -rify whether y have all T ne 
9 irif'-.i - f errn (if m i ' it a fai: . fatemenr? 
10 A Correct III il wc • • require - ^ , 
11 records and then could correlate them with wiM1 I ht/e. 
12 Q But whatever"s been given to y< . you 
1 3 h . i , r ' • • " i <«j wt'I1"-
14 A Yes. 
15 Q For example, r- - - t
 : ou have?: not see any 
"• " records from h c»- i r f »•» t * * •* 
1 7 A a I " Mi " f P r e l i e f ell I r • 
] 8 a n d x -*— ' i. . . •. ; h.., Lin . 
] 9 A1 ] right. Originally when you first started 
20 treatirq were you finished looking? Go ahead. 
21 H-S. 
22 \ Originally when you first treated Nicholas, 
23 wou1 c .+ be a fair statement to state that you saw him 
•
 1L
 as r- *~v~ physician from Dr. Vogeler? 
it1, 
15 
xj L? J 
1 Q And he presented to you having a traumatic 
2 brain injury, correct. 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q And it was an objectively diagnosed brain 
5 injury, correct? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q Tell me what your understanding is of his 
8 current residual scans of the brain. What is visible, 
9 what is objective about his brain presently as you look 
10 at scans regarding any injury? 
11 A Well, first of all, the word presently is a 
12 bit difficult there. If you mean presently meaning 
13 now, I don't know what might be his latest scan, so all 
14 I know is what we have in the records that I've looked 
15 at. 
16 Q Let me back up and say to the last point in 
17 time that you have record of or that you know about. 
18 A Let me, then, answer that this way. Let me go 
19 backwards through the records I have to see what is the 
20 last scan that I have referenced. 
21 Q By the way, did you see the scans themselves 
22 or only the reports? 
23 A I think I just saw the reports. 
24 It looks like the last scan referenced is the 
25 one of Michael Goldstein from March 21st of 2001, and 
16 
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1 at that time my note regarding what he said he saw was, 
2 quote,, Findings are consistent with remote post 
3 trau ma t i c c h a n g e s Th e r e a :t : e s in a 1 3 h e i n : i :i : h a g e s a n d • 
4 encephalomalacia at the frontal poles and left frontal 
5 convexity. 
6 g Convert that, < 1- ••>.-•• . M;!'.- \ ^\ \ anuuaqe. 
7 A So tne scan w^. .=
 ; .•;. • . -.;:..; consiD* -mt 
8 w i t h the conclusion that he had piior ii-niry Tiu.-. 
9 residuals included evidence ot old i. ronta.1 hemorrhage 
10 a..-- :hli'. W -< • •:: 
1 1 hlH) . . ' • . ; " ! ; .v.,..:! : '. .•- a i c a l.-,;:i.: : . . ! I : 1 Oie i iead . 
12 Meaning t h a t what . ' i>ey have a t r o p h y , t h e y a r e 
13 j u s t ch .sr-.i r- t, * ' i a t ? 
14 A I 
15 e n c e p h a l o m a l ^ v ^ ^ „tea;.L3 u t i ^ . L a i d ; abnoiiiui it ies which 
16 certain 1 y can include that. So by us i n•; *: he word 
17 enc e p h a 1 oma 1 a c i a, they me an 111 a t t he br.n ! •  i s n o w 
1 8 a b ii o i: in a 3 3 ;;y z ::»n f :i g i 11 e :i s .n :i i ; n :l = • :i : t: h a t • :: : i II :i c e :i : t a :i n 3 > 
19 be atrophy as one of the components. 
20 < What about generalized atrophy, are you aware 
21 of whether or not Nick's brain has suffered such from 
22 t. 
23 :'hjs report doesn't mention generalized 
24 atrophy.. .And as I said, that's the last report that I 
25 see in the records. 
17 
1 Q But what I'm asking you is do you know of any 
2 record that has indicated generalized atrophy of his 
3 brain? 
4 A Let me look back to see what else we've got 
5 here. 
6 Another scan that I see is from July of 1999. 
7 And, again, that reported small parenchymal hemorrhages 
8 primarily in the frontal lobes again. 
9 Q So you have no opinion whether there was or 
10 was not; is that a fair statement? 
11 A Correct on that one. 
12 And then we had one from May of 1998, which 
13 was a CT brain scan and that was read as normal, that's 
14 a different technology, but that technology was read as 
15 normal. Now, it is noted, as well, that the CT brain 
16 scan of 1998 was negative and the CT brain scan of 1999 
17 was positive; however, that may represent an evolution 
18 in the sophistication of the machinery, presumably it 
19 does not mean that he developed secondary hemorrhage, 
20 but -- I don't know a reason why he would do that, but 
21 I would note that those two reports say different 
22 things. So I know --
23 Q So it's consistent with the rather significant 
24 auto injury, isn't it? 
25 A Right. 
18 
1 Q The hemorrhaging and the possible skull 
2 fracture and so forth? 
3 A Correct. So I have nothing that I can see in 
4 my notes that said that anybody said he had general 
5 cerebral atrophy. Now, that doesn't mean he couldn't 
6 have had, I just don't have that in my notes and I 
7 don't see having referenced that in my notes. 
8 Has somebody said that? 
9 Q Well --
10 A I realize you're asking the questions, I'm 
11 just trying to understand the patient. 
12 Q I understand that. We'll just have to deal 
13 with that another time I'm afraid. 
14 A Okay. 
15 Q I'm trying to understand, as you are assessing 
16 the paper review, what you're finding and what you 
17 think is significant. 
18 A Okay. 
19 Q Now, regarding your impressions and 
20 conclusions, since I've not had a chance to read them, 
21 with the exception of a few paragraphs, why don't you 
22 summarize what you believe to be, first of all, the 
23 areas that you have addressed and then we'll talk 
24 specifically about your impressions and conclusions. 
25 A Okay. Well, as a neurologist, my main 
19 
1 interest is in his nervous system. I did reference 
2 other issues such as the lung contusion and abrasions, 
3 but my main interest, of course, would be in his 
4 nervous system and its function. And in the broad 
5 overview, the first perspective was clearly injury. 
6 There is no question he was injured and that he had 
7 highly objective evidence of quite significant injury. 
8 That injury occurred not only in his brain, 
9 but also occurred as a lung contusion, multiple 
10 abrasions, and I also talk about low back problems and 
11 suggested his lumbar disc protrusion was probably 
12 related to this accident also. 
13 Now -- so the first perspective is injury. 
14 The second perspective is the issue of the seizures and 
15 what are we doing with that. And as you know from our 
16 conversation the other day, when I first saw him and he 
17 began to mention these -- well, actually, when I first 
18 saw him, because he had a clearly objective brain 
19 injury and because some of these patients may develop 
20 seizures, I did an EEG, and his EEG showed some 
21 dysrhythmia, which was of fairly nonspecific type, not 
22 clearly seizures, but not, at the same time, excluding 
23 seizures. Given the fact that he had had this brain 
24 injury and had an EEG showing a dysrhythmia, then the 
25 question came up whether or not he could be having --
20 
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1 he could be at risk for seizures and, therefore, 
2 whether we should put him on medications, and I did put 
3 him on Depakote. 
4 Now, what I don't recall off the top of my 
5 head, we would have to look back through the details to 
6 retrieve this, but I don't recall whether he mentioned 
7 he had spells at the time we first gave him the 
8 Depakote or whether it was the combination of just a 
9 clear head injury and an EEG showing a dysrhythmia that 
10 led to the Depakote. I don't remember which way that 
11 actually worked, so I would have to look back to see if 
12 there was any actual mention of any spells. 
13 However, certainly, at around that time 
14 afterward or before, but around that time, he did 
15 develop, then, these reported spells and we put him on 
16 Depakote and his spells then improved. So putting 
17 together the issue of brain injury and the EEG and the 
18 report of spells and the report that the spells 
19 improved with the anticonvulsant, I then concluded he 
20 had seizures. 
21 However, there also was in the background his 
22 prior history of depression and there was the 
23 additional observation that his EEG didn't show any 
24 definite seizure activity, so I put in the records, 
2 5 even in that early stage that I -- this was not a 
21 
1 confirmed diagnosis of seizures, but rather was a 
2 possible diagnosis and it was a strategic approach 
3 recognizing that seizures can get somebody into trouble 
4 and all of that. 
5 Q You did reach a diagnosis, did you not, in 
6 your records that there was a seizure disorder? 
7 A Right. And so -- yes, I did. And as I said, 
8 I also included in the records the recognition that 
9 that was not completely confirmed, but it was my 
10 working diagnosis. So we treated him for these spells 
11 and he did well and that supported the idea that he had 
12 seizures and then we went on with that. 
13 Now, as you know, as this problem evolved, it 
14 eventually came that Nick stopped seeing me, and so 
15 then later when I got involved in this again when I was 
16 asked to review his record, then looking through the 
17 records what I found was that his spells, which were 
18 being labelled as seizures, were apparently being 
19 repeated and were apparently not so responsive to 
20 medications. In addition, subsequent EEGs had not 
21 confirmed seizures and, in fact, there was even the 
22 report that his ambulatory monitoring showed a lack of 
23 correlation between his spells and his EEG. So then 
24 all of that raised the question whether he really did 
25 have seizures, and that raises the question whether the 
22 
1 failure of the treatment as time went on was related to 
2 insufficient treatment of seizures or whether it was 
3 due to the fact that these weren't seizures. 
4 So based on my review and in the August 
5 document that I generated, my position was that I had 
6 started him on these medications on the hypothesis of 
7 seizures based on early data, subsequent data did not 
8 apparently demonstrate EEGs confirming seizures, and 
9 his course apparently did not show good response to 
10 treatment, so then I brought up the possibility that I 
11 actually generated a mythology, the mythology that he 
12 seizures. Now, obviously, I don't intend to generate 
13 mythologies in patients, but it can be done 
14 accidentally and, you know, inadvertently. 
15 So then when looking back, given, again, the 
16 perspective that subsequent EEGs did not confirm 
17 seizures, what I recognized was that it was possible, 
18 his spells were actually not seizures, that his 
19 response to the Depakote was either incidental or was 
20 treating his underlying depressive disorder and that 
21 the whole label of seizures was not really a confirmed 
22 pathophysiologic mechanism. 
23 Now, as I told you the other day when we 
24 talked, I would consider this issue still currently 
25 unresolved based on the data that I have, okay, which 
23 
1 is I don't actually know if he had seizures or has 
2 seizures. Had meaning he could have had some at the 
3 beginning and perhaps his subsequent spells are now of 
4 other mechanism. Or it could be that he has seizures 
5 at this time and they are inadequately controlled, 
6 based on what I have read in the records at least. 
7 But which is the correct answer? Well, as I 
8 told you the other day, that depends upon biologically 
9 whether we can confirm that there actually is a seizure 
10 pathophysiology going on. And as you recall, I 
11 suggested that it might be worth while for you to send 
12 him to the university to have them look at the issue to 
13 see if they can confirm whether his spells are actually 
14 seizures or not. 
15 You also brought up the issue that apparently 
16 his family has offered the possibility that maybe he 
17 had seizures at the beginning, and you mentioned maybe 
18 that you thought only one of them was actually a 
19 seizure, and that maybe his other spells were not 
2 0 seizures, that they were some other mechanism. So I 
21 don't know that we know entirely, but it's very 
22 important to this patient, it's also important to you 
23 guys as you do your job, but it's important to this 
24 patient because ultimately we have to decide what we're 
25 treating, and in order for him to do well, we have to 
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1 try to treat the correct pathophysiology. 
2 So at this time, my summary on the seizure 
3 issue is that I was the one that originally started it 
4 and based on early data, I did accept the diagnosis of 
5 seizures but subsequent information has apparently not 
6 clearly confirmed that process and my question now --
7 and I will leave it as a question --is does he really 
8 have seizures or is that a mythology that I started and 
9 it is really not seizures, but some other kind of 
10 problem. 
11 As I've already referenced, he had an 
12 underlying psychiatric disorder with depression and 
13 that's important because it can generate symptoms 
14 itself and then you get into the issue of trying to 
15 determine which mechanism generates symptoms that he 
16 may be claiming at this time. So, for example, if he's 
17 claiming cognitive dysfunction at this time or fatigue 
18 at this time or spells of altered consciousness at this 
19 time, which mechanism generates those? Is it brain 
2 0 disorder of structural type related to trauma or is it 
21 his depressive disorder and perhaps psychophysiologic 
22 mechanisms. 
23 So that is something we have to try to analyze 
24 in the accurate care of the patient, but also in regard 
25 to what you all do, okay. And as I've said, and I told 
25 
1 you the other day, data can shift this thing one way or 
2 the other. In other words, if we have solid evidence 
3 that he's having seizures, then, great, that resolves 
4 the issue. If we don't have solid evidence that he's 
5 having seizures, then we would have to try to determine 
6 what is the nature and cause of the spells he may be 
7 having, and I say having recognizing that I've only 
8 looked at his records, I don't know what this man looks 
9 like clinically at this time, so I don't know what his 
10 current behavioral state is or what he claim at this 
11 moment. 
12 So whatever information we have, whatever 
13 solid information we have would be very important in 
14 trying to determine what we currently view as the 
15 problem, and then when you have that perspective, you 
16 can then look backward to try to decide what do we 
17 think that meant in the early stage. So, for example, 
18 if it was true that he had studies at the university 
19 now, let's say, and they confirmed that he had an 
20 active seizure disorder, active seizure focus, then 
21 several things become important for him. One is that 
22 we've confirmed that that's the mechanism of his 
23 spells. Number two, you then have to determine what's 
24 the optimal treatment for the spells, medical or 
25 surgical or whatever. And number three, in regard to 
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1 prognosis, adjudication, that sort of thing, then you 
2 guys would have that information to decide your parts 
3 of it, whatever's going to happen there. 
4 Q Let me interrupt you for a second. Tell me 
5 what tests you're specifically referring to or believe 
6 would be helpful in determining this? 
7 A Well, he's had one ambulatory EEG, but I think 
8 having another ambulatory EEG or even inpatient 
9 monitoring at the university would be very helpful. 
10 Inpatient monitoring would be ideal. And before I 
11 finish that, let me just raise a point here. We're 
12 treating the patient. If he has no symptoms, then 
13 going -- putting him through inpatient monitoring would 
14 be a waste of everybody's effort. 
15 So presuming he has symptoms now, presuming 
16 this is a struggle we need to struggle with, okay. So 
17 if we need to struggle with this, the patient is on 
18 medicines and we're not sure whether he needs to be on 
19 them or the patient is having spells that are not 
2 0 adequately controlled, if those are true, then I would 
21 suggest you consider inpatient monitoring at the 
22 university where they can look in detail at evidence 
23 for seizures, and they can also see what his spells 
24 look like to determine what is the relationship between 
25 those spells and any EEG findings that he may have. 
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1 If that did not answer the question, there are 
2 other tests that conceivably you could do. Over in 
3 Research Park they have MEG studies, 
4 magnetoencephalography, it's a research test and I 
5 don't know that you guys would want to get into it 
6 because it's not something that your venue may want to 
7 go into. In other words, it's research level stuff, 
8 but if you're trying to struggle, as I do, with how do 
9 you take care of the patient, you use whatever tools 
10 you can. 
11 So over there they have a test and it is 
12 apparently quite sensitive for looking for evidence of 
13 active seizure foci. They have a thing called magnetic 
14 source imaging at Research Park which did not get out 
15 of the lab, at least at this moment. I think for 
16 technical reasons, it's very expensive and time 
17 consuming. But that technique apparently is highly 
18 sensitive, so conceivably if we really had to struggle, 
19 those would be something else that could be done in the 
20 struggle to try to analyze the problem. Certainly the 
21 most practical clinical approaches would simply be 
22 inpatient monitoring at the university. 
23 If you can then use a test of that type and 
24 confirm the mechanism of his spells, you could then 
25 delineate not only the optimal treatment approaches, 
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1 but also you could delineate the whole adjudication 
2 discussion of that -- for that piece of it at least. 
3 In regard to treatment for him if he's having 
4 seizures, there are various kinds of approaches. There 
5 are not only medications, but there's also such 
6 treatments as vagal nerve stimulators and even seizure 
7 surgery. If a patient has a focused seizure disorder 
8 due to a focal structural abnormality and if 
9 medications are not working well, there is an 
10 increasing interest in seizure surgery because you may 
11 be able to remove the seizure focus. 
12 The enthusiasm for that type of technique 
13 varies depending upon different research centers and 
14 things and it' s not something that everybody has 
15 agreement on, but certainly in the literature there is 
16 some increasing enthusiasm for that perspective. 
17 Q Is that a fairly expensive surgery? 
18 A It is. 
19 Q And any idea what that kind of expense would 
20 be? 
21 A I don't. I have no idea. 
22 Q But it is relatively new, therefore, it will 
23 be fairly costly, I assume? 
24 A It's not new, but I think there's changing 
25 views of its use. When I was going through training 
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1 and even up to very recent years, seizure surgery was 
2 relegated to people who had failed numerous medications 
3 and really were having refractory state. In the 
4 literature in recent years there has been the argument 
5 that if people have failed a couple of medications --
6 and couple may be too minimal, but there are some 
7 articles advocating that -- that if they have failed a 
8 couple of medications and they have a very clear 
9 seizure focus that we should consider the possibility 
10 of removing the seizure focus. And the reason for that 
11 argument is the observation of the costs to the patient 
12 of lifetime treatment, as well as side effects of 
13 medications and so forth. So the balances are shifting 
14 and there is more interest than there has been in the 
15 past. 
16 Now, you can certainly talk to Fred Matsuo or 
17 Tawnya Constantino -- Matsuo is, M-A-T-S-U-0, and 
18 Constantino is C-O-N-S-T-A-N-I-N-0 -- who are in the 
19 Department of Neurology at the university and are their 
20 epileptologists, E-P-I-L-E-P-T-O-L-O-G-I-S-T-S, and 
21 they can TELL you what they believe IS the role of 
22 seizure surgery at this time, so that would be a place 
23 for you guys to gather some more information about that 
24 topic. 
25 Certainly it -- to consider it, you have to 
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1 have a very focus sed lesion, you have to have something 
2 where we know that we have confirmed the patient's 
3 clinical spells are due to discharge -- you know, the 
4 seizure discharge in a particular area and we've seen 
5 that that area is recurrently involved so that we 
6 believe removing that area or fixing it would be 
7 useful. 
8 Q How do you find that focused area? EEGs are 
9 more generalized, aren't they? 
10 A Well, to an extent, yes. There are various 
11 EEGs and they have multielectrode EEGs and they have 
12 other kinds of techniques. You can use *SPEC scans and 
13 other kinds of things. 
14 Q Would the MEGs be specific enough to locate 
15 a --
16 A Well, if they're out of the lab, yes. The MEG 
17 is apparently a good test from what I've heard, 
18 although as I said, it did not make it out of the lab 
19 to clinical practice in this valley at least, so we 
2 0 cannot order them as a routine clinical study, and even 
21 the word routine may have to be taken with caution 
22 here. It's not something you would use on every 
23 patient because it's very expensive and difficult to 
24 obtain, but we cannot order them as a way of analyzing 
25 patients on a routine basis. 
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1 So you would have to talk with the guys at the 
2 Department of Neurology at the university, the 
3 epileptologists to see what they say and what they say 
4 is the role of that test and whether or not they send 
5 patients over there and how they choose who they send 
6 over there to see what they have to say. And I don't 
7 know what they would say at this point. I also know 
8 you may even get difference of opinions between the two 
9 of them. These are not easy issues and there are 
10 patients who, you know, can get differing opinion even 
11 from very good sources. So I don't know what they 
12 would say in regard to Nicholas, but you can certainly 
13 check to see what they would say. 
14 The other way of looking at it is --
15 Q Before you move into the other etiology -- I 
16 assume that's where you were headed? 
17 A Actually, I was going to go the other way, so 
18 looking -- for seizures, you can actually do cortical 
19 recordings. If they think they are down to the problem 
20 well enough, they can actually record off the cortex of 
21 the brain. That's rarely done because that means you 
22 have to open a person's head, but -- and so they would 
23 not go there with Nicholas, I don't think. But the 
24 point is, there are other techniques that can be used 
25 and certainly the guys at the university are going to 
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1 be the ones who are best qualified to tell you what the 
2 current state of the art on all of that. 
3 Q Out of all of those procedures, you would 
4 recommend, as you presently understand the situation, 
5 the U of U studies as you have described, and if not 
6 consider and explore the EMGs? 
7 A The MEGs. 
8 Q Sorry MEGs, I misstated. 
9 A Yes, yes. 
10 Q Now, on the vagus nerve stimulator, tell me 
11 what that is -- what that involves and the nature of 
12 that treatment. 
13 A In interesting curiosity, it has been found 
14 that stimulating the vagus nerve may abort some kinds 
15 of seizures. That has been pursued and there now is an 
16 implantable stimulator which is -- the stimulator 
17 itself is put in the upper chest and wires are run to 
18 the neck where the electrodes are placed around the 
19 vagus nerve in the neck and the patient then receives 
20 intermittent stimulation of the vagus nerve over the 
21 course of the day. 
22 With that stimulation, you may produce control 
23 of some kinds of seizure disorders. Vagal nerve 
24 stimulation should be reserved for only a very selected 
25 subpopulation because it's got risks and it's very 
33 
071 
1 expensive and you can have infection problems and other 
2 kinds of things. But, again, if you have confirmed 
3 that a patient has a definite seizure disorder which is 
4 refractory to medical management of the usual medicine, 
5 then it is something to consider. 
6 I would only consider that from the 
7 university, and the reason is that there are some 
8 places in this state where I think their criteria for 
9 inserting the stimulator is perhaps much lesser than 
10 the university would use and I think there's sometimes 
11 a question of whether there are economic issues 
12 playing. So I would personally suggest that if you 
13 look at that, you take the university's opinion on that 
14 subject. 
15 Q Now, since I understand you to say that the 
16 jury's still out in your mind as to the source of these 
17 seizures --
18 A Or spells. 
19 Q Spells or seizures, whichever they may be — I 
2 0 guess let me back up and say, regarding the nature of 
21 this particular kind of brain injury and its residuary 
22 effect on the frontal lobes, this kind of seizure 
23 activity is certainly consistent with such injury, is 
24 it not? 
25 A Oh, yes. 
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1 Q And it isn't a remote stretch to reach the 
2 conclusion, as you did, that they are related to the 
3 brain injury? 
4 A Not at all. 
5 Q All right. Now, what other opinion do you 
6 have? 
7 A I also --
8 Q Let me back up. Assuming that this is an 
9 organically caused seizure, what has been your 
10 experience in terms of this type of history, that is 
11 that there were some perhaps more significant seizures 
12 and now these spells that continue to occur, what type 
13 of prognosis or future is someone with this kind of 
14 condition looking at? 
15 A Well, that's a very good question and it gets 
16 down to the point of which specific pathophysiology 
17 accounts for the continuing spells. Even as you 
18 referenced the other day when we talked, it's possible 
19 that he has more than one pathophysiology. So, for 
2 0 example, it's possible that he has seizures and he also 
21 has psychiatric induced spells. We know, for example, 
22 that pseudo seizures, which are psychiatrically induced 
23 seeming seizure events, are most common in patients who 
24 actually have seizures. That's a very complicated 
25 subject, but the importance of it in this patient who 
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1 has an underlying depressive disorder is that for him 
2 to do well with treatment, we have to try to be 
3 accurate about the actual mechanism. 
4 So he could have more than one mechanism, he 
5 could have some seizures and some pseudo seizures, or 
6 he could have some seizures and some other kind of 
7 spell, but if that is true, then the prognosis for the 
8 different spells depends upon what each of the spells 
9 is due to and depends upon how each of the spells is 
10 behaving. 
11 Q Well, that's why I was asking to assume that 
12 these are physical in origin as opposed to pseudo. And 
13 by the way, why don't you just quickly define what 
14 pseudo means to you as you're using it? 
15 A Well, pseudo seizures as people use it in the 
16 literature means that it's something that may casually 
17 or even to an expert appear to be a seizure, but is, in 
18 fact, not a formal seizure process, and the seizure 
19 process is that group of physical or behavioral 
20 symptoms which may derive from brief bursts of abnormal 
21 electrical brain activity. 
22 Q All right. Still appearing to be a seizure 
23 because of an abnormal electrical brain abnormality, 
24 but its cause is not physical in origin, or am I 
25 understanding you right? 
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1 A Not quite. In other words, the word seizure 
2 encompasses all those manifestations which derive from 
3 a singular type of process. The process is abnormal 
4 brain electrical activity. Now, if you change the 
5 focus out to the symptoms, then there are patients who 
6 have symptoms that may look like seizures, but they 
7 don't have that abnormal brain electrical activity, 
8 they are not -- the symptoms don't stem from that 
9 process. 
10 So the simplistic example there is what is 
11 hysterical seizures or what are routinely in 
12 neurological parlance called pseudo seizures, which 
13 means they look like seizures, but they aren't and 
14 they're usually psychiatrically generated events. It's 
15 not -- even that differential diagnosis is not entirely 
16 complete. In other words, a person could have --
17 technically could have a pseudo seizure due to a 
18 cardiac arrhythmia, that would be technically a pseudo 
19 seizure, meaning it looks like a seizure, but it isn't; 
20 however, people don't generally use the term in that 
21 way, they generally use the term pseudo seizure to 
22 imply a psychiatric mechanism. 
23 Q All right. Now, going back to my original 
24 question. I was having you assume that these spells 
25 are physical in origin, you've seen how they've been 
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1 described in the records. Assuming they are physical 
2 origin, that is, originating from the brain injury, 
3 what prognosis does someone like that have? 
4 A It depends upon how well we can control them, 
5 so... 
6 Q So the medications thus far don't appear to 
7 have affected them significantly, they would at least 
8 at times -- well, you know the record, go ahead and 
9 explain. 
10 A So from what I can tell in the records, it 
11 sounds like the medicines have not been effective in 
12 controlling the spells. That means one of two things, 
13 the medicines are not -- well, actually, one of three 
14 things. First, it could mean the medicines are not 
15 effective because we have not found the right 
16 medication or medications. Secondly, it could mean 
17 that the medication was not effective because 
18 medications as a strategy are not sufficient for the 
19 problem. Thirdly, and you're excluding this one in 
20 your current hypothesis, is that the medication is not 
21 effective because it's not really a seizure disorder. 
22 But now if we consider that there are patients 
23 who have seizures who will fail medications because 
24 medications are not able to control the underlying 
25 process, then we look at the other alternative 
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1 treatments, such as the vagal nerve stimulator or 
2 epilepsy surgery as I mentioned. 
3 Q Otherwise these spells or seizures continue on 
4 indefinitely, is that the bottom line? 
5 A The usual prognosis for an established post 
6 traumatic seizure disorder is that it's permanent, the 
7 usual prognosis. That's not always true, but that's 
8 usually true. 
9 Q With age do they progressively worsen? 
10 A Usually not. They can, but usually not. 
11 Q Now, go ahead with the rest of your opinions. 
12 A So one issue, then, is the seizure. Second 
13 issue is behavioral consequences of brain injury. So 
14 then you get into this very elaborate area of what kind 
15 of behavioral changes may you reasonably expect as a 
16 biological derivative of brain injury, and that's a 
17 complicated area to talk about. One of the most 
18 interesting and often referenced examples of that 
19 discussion is the *Fenius Gage argument. Are you 
20 familiar with that? 
21 Q I am. 
22 A So that whole one is very interesting because 
23 it represents the observation of marked behavioral 
24 changes due to frontal lobe dysfunction due to 
25 anatomical severing of some of the frontal lobe 
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1 pathways. 
2 So we know without question that if you injure 
3 somebody badly enough you can produce behavior changes. 
4 Now, in this man, then, who has had underlying behavior 
5 disorders, what do you then do if he has continued 
6 behavior disorders, to which element do you attribute 
7 that? Do you attribute it to his underlying problem or 
8 do you attribute it to his injury problem? 
9 Q Or a combination? 
10 A Or a combination, exactly. And that's going 
11 to be difficult, but it is a reasonable place for us 
12 all to struggle because it is reasonable to wonder what 
13 his behaviors may have done or what may have been done 
14 to his behaviors by his injury. 
15 Q Certainly the literature is replete with 
16 examples and research of how if someone had some 
17 depressive disorder, a brain injury to the frontal lobe 
18 often aggravates that. You're familiar with that, are 
19 you not? 
20 A Well, that's an interesting question. First 
21 of all, can it aggravate it, yes. Does it often 
22 aggravate it and how does it aggravate it, that becomes 
23 much more difficult. Let me tell you what I mean by 
24 that. First of all, when we're discussing these 
25 things, you have to recognize that very commonly we are 
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1 talking in terms of reported symptoms rather than 
2 path -- than observable quantifiable pathophysiologic 
3 mechanisms. 
4 So if you were to go to Africa where people do 
5 not have all of these kind of social context such as 
6 we're currently involved in and somebody had a head 
7 injury and previously had a head -- had a depressive 
8 disorder and their behaviors changed afterward, you 
9 could reasonably assume this is probably going to be 
10 somehow biologically interlinked and the Fenius Gage 
11 discussion is a very great example of that. 
12 However, when you get into societies where 
13 there are these other social issues, then the problem 
14 you struggle with is how do you know that the patient 
15 was biologically changed versus the patient was 
16 sociologically changed, that is to say their underlying 
17 disorder, which was *self-quailing because it was their 
18 own responsibility now suddenly becomes 
19 self-reinforcing because it becomes somebody else's 
2 0 responsibility. So then if the patient changes, are 
21 they changing because of the change in sociologically 
22 *milieu or are they changing because they actually had 
23 a biological change in their brain structure. So it's 
24 a tough area. 
25 Q I understand that the etiology or the actual 
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1 cause of change can be difficult to determine, that's 
2 not my point. That was not my question. My question 
3 is the literature recognizes, does it not, that there's 
4 a correlation between frontal lobe injuries and 
5 aggravation of any preexisting mental disorders? 
6 A Yes, there is some correlation. Does that 
7 mean it's true in every patient, no, but there is 
8 correlation. 
9 Q In the high percentage, correct? 
10 A Well, show me the articles you're referencing, 
11 let's look at the population base that they drew from. 
12 Q I'm just asking you based on your knowledge of 
13 the literature. If you don't know, that's fine? 
14 A Well, it's not that I don't know. It's rather 
15 that when you say high percentage, which specific 
16 references are you talking about and what do you mean 
17 by high percentage. So let's back it up and look at it 
18 this way. If you look at people who are involved in 
19 brain injury where there is no secondary gain 
20 involvement, that group of people infrequently argues 
21 that their underlying state was changed permanently. 
22 Now, not zero --
23 Q What's the foundation for that opinion? 
24 A My foundation for that opinion is my 
25 experience over the years of seeing patients with those 
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1 kinds of situations, that's where I get that 
2 perspective. 
3 If -- so, now, does that mean that no one ever 
4 claims -- ever -- let me rephrase this. 
5 Does that mean that there are no patients who 
6 assert there is a worsening? No, that does not mean 
7 that there are no patients who assert a worsening --
8 there's a bunch of negatives in there, but what it 
9 means is that when there's no ax to grind, usually from 
10 a standard brain injury, people do not assert their 
11 behaviors change. 
12 When there's secondary gain issues, they may 
13 and much more often do. In fact, when there's 
14 secondary gain perspective, then there's a very high 
15 percentage who report that they're worse. But that's 
16 in that secondary gain population, it is not what we 
17 see in the nonsecondary gain population. 
18 Also -- and Nicholas, for example, he went on 
19 to become suicidal. Suicidal behavior is a very 
20 interesting discussion, but it is not what derives from 
21 normal brain injury. And the reason for that is 
22 suicidal behavior is a derivative of people who are 
23 emotionally isolated, they are not well connected, they 
24 are not well interrelated to other people so that the 
25 idea of escaping the world on that basis is more 
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1 acceptable to them. That's a very broad statement and 
2 it's not going to apply to everybody, but it's a 
3 generalization. It works fairly well. 
4 There are certainly people who enter 
5 situations which are so abhorrent to them that they may 
6 become suicidal, such as a person who loses their 
7 entire, you know, personal fortune or something. But 
8 suicidal behavior occurs in certain types of 
9 individuals and there are certainly people who -- lots 
10 of people who have terrible injuries and terrible 
11 problems who don't become suicidal, they may become 
12 depressed, but they don't become suicidal. 
13 So this is a difficult area, and I don't want 
14 to paint it as if we can polarize it to all or nothing 
15 discussions. We're talking about shifting potentials 
16 and possibilities, therefore, if you looked at 
17 Mr. Sorensen's later suicidal behavior and said 
18 statistically what's most likely, is this most likely 
19 to derive from his underlying depression or is it most 
20 likely to derive from his brain injury? I would argue 
21 it's most likely to derive from his underlying 
22 depression. That's my opinion. 
23 Q Have you reached an opinion whether or not his 
24 underlying depression presently has been aggravated or 
25 enhanced by his brain injury? 
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1 A Well, again, I have not seen him in a long 
2 time, so I don't know what he looks like or what he 
3 says. All I can tell you is in the records it does --
4 the records seem to shift over time to quite a focus on 
5 his psychiatric state and seem to focus to, for 
6 example, his suicidal levels of depression. And the 
7 question then comes up where does that come from, is 
8 that a derivative of injury or is it a derivative of, 
9 you know, psychology and sociology. And in treating 
10 this man, that has a big and huge impact because if 
11 you're going to try to treat him, you have to 
12 understand which mechanism is promoting the current 
13 state. 
14 So my view at this time is that while there's 
15 no question Nick had very, significant injury, no 
16 question about that, I think most of his depressive 
17 behavior is probably derived from his underlying 
18 illness rather than from the consequences of injury. 
19 Q Maybe this would be a good time to start. 
2 0 You've mentioned a number of times that he's had a 
21 depressive disorder. Can you tell me specifically what 
22 you're referring to as a historical depressive 
2 3 disorder? 
24 A Let's see where that came from. It was way 
25 back at the beginning when that all came out, and I 
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1 believe he told me about it, but let me look back and 
2 see. 
3 Yes, he told me about it. When I first saw 
4 him in August of 1999, he reported that he had been 
5 depressed and that he had been on Effexor, and he also 
6 made reference to having been jumped a year prior by 
7 some gang members or somebody or other and that the 
8 problem had gotten worse at that time. 
9 Q Let me see what you're referring to. Is that 
10 your history questionnaire? 
11 A Yes. And that's -- this is my writing here. 
12 This is whoever filled in the form, him or whoever, 
13 that's their writing. This is my writing of what he 
14 told me at that time. 
15 Also --
16 Q Now, let me -- go ahead. Anything else you 
17 recall about -- other than being jumped? 
18 A Well, here's what he had told me and what I 
19 wrote in my August 4th letter. "He apparently had 
20 depression in the years past which became worse a year 
21 ago when he was jumped by some gang members. Quite 
22 recently, he has been tried on Effexor, and we do not 
23 know exactly how this is going to work as he has just 
24 recently started it." 
25 Q That is your understanding of what was 
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1 reported to you, that he was on Effexor at the time of 
2 the accident or at the time you saw him? 
3 A At the time I saw him, yes. 
4 Q And that this -- that for what period of time 
5 had he had any depressive episode prior to being jumped 
6 by this gang? 
7 A Well, he told me years. 
8 Q Where is that said? 
9 A On the bottom of the first page from the 
10 August 4th, 1999 letter. 
11 Q But I'm saying, is there any reference in your 
12 notes that he either wrote or that you wrote down while 
13 interviewing him where he said he had been depressed 
14 for years? 
15 A Well, let's see. 
16 Q There's a difference between being depressed 
17 for years and then what you put he apparently had 
18 depression in the years past. That seems to mean 
19 something very different. 
20 A Well, now we're into semantics, and at the 
21 time that I'm seeing him I'm just taking care of him, 
22 so I'm not writing a letter that's going to stand up to 
23 legal scrutiny of every word. 
24 Q But I'm trying to understand what you know 
25 regarding any depressive history, because there is not 
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1 a record of such history. 
2 A Okay. All right. So if there is no record of 
3 such history, then I would simply go -- and by the way, 
4 you have to go back to whoever gave him the Effexor 
5 probably, but that's all that I know and that's what he 
6 told me. I'm just simply writing down what I 
7 understood him to tell me. 
8 Q That's what I'm trying to understand. Where 
9 is it that you wrote down that he had had depression 
10 for years? 
11 A Again, I made the note that --of what he told 
12 me there and what -- the way I wrote it, the way I 
13 wrote my note -- I mean -- let me back up. 
14 When I'm seeing a patient, we are --I'm 
15 writing down handwritten notes of things that people 
16 are saying to jog my memory for the dictation. I do 
17 not write down every word they say, nor do I write it 
18 down in such a way as to try to answer every possible 
19 question about it. So I'm trying to make some notes 
20 that I can then refer to. 
21 Q But do you have notes that talk about any 
22 years of depression, that's what I'm asking? Or is 
23 this something you remembered and then put it in your 
24 letter of August 4th? 
25 A It's what I wrote down in my letter to 
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1 Dr. Vogeler from what he told me, and exactly what 
2 words he used, I cannot tell you. 
3 Q Is there anything in the history questionnaire 
4 that refers to being depressed for years? 
5 A No. 
6 Q I can't read your writing, I'm just asking you 
7 if there is anything in there? 
8 A No. Do you know him gave him the Effexor? 
9 Q Are you asking me to answer the question? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q I think I do, but go ahead. 
12 A What I would suggest is that you look at the 
13 records of whoever gave him the Effexor --
14 Q We have. 
15 A and see what they say. 
16 Q That's why I say there's not a history of what 
17 you're describing. 
18 A Then the other possibility is that I 
19 misunderstood him. 
2 0 Q All right. But, anyway, you have reached your 
21 conclusion that most of his behavioral problems are a 
22 result of a history of depressive disorders; is that 
23 right? 
24 A Well, again, I'm going on the fact that he had 
25 the underlying problems and then I'm going on the way 
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1 the problem played out over time and observations 
2 regarding this issue of depression in the setting of 
3 head injury. 
4 Now, having said all of that, a few things. 
5 First, I would not advocate that everyone who has head 
6 injury is free of depression. I would not say that. 
7 Certainly people may get depression after a head 
8 injury. I would not advocate any hypothesis that said 
9 that head injury could not produce mechanisms which set 
10 in motion a depression, they can. 
11 In this man, my understanding of the problem 
12 at the time was that he had background depression, if 
13 that understanding is incorrect, then I'm sorry, that 
14 was my understanding, okay. 
15 Q I'm not saying he didn't have a situational 
16 depression. I'm asking you what you know about it if 
17 anything? 
18 A No, that's all I know is what I have in those 
19 records. 
20 So if he had -- if he had a brief or 
21 situational depression and if that was not, then, an 
22 underlying tendency, then you would make a stronger 
23 argument for this problem being related to head injury; 
24 however, as I've said, if you look at the behavior of 
25 suicidal depression, it is not a common result of 
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1 natural head injury syndrome, and there's lots of 
2 places to look for that kind of perspective, but it is 
3 not a common thing. It's not impossible, it's just not 
4 common. 
5 Q Now, have we covered all of the information 
6 which you know about --
7 A No. 
8 Q from which you have drawn a conclusion that 
9 there is a history of depression? 
10 A Oh, yes, I believe we have. 
11 Q And you're conceding that without additional 
12 information the more situational the depressive episode 
13 may have been, the more that that would indicate that 
14 the component causation of the seizures may be --
15 pardon me, of the depression may be head injury of 
16 origin? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q Go ahead with the rest. 
19 A Just to set a couple of issues aside because 
20 you asked me a long time ago what other issues were in 
21 my report --
22 Q Have we covered all the seizure disorder 
23 issues? 
24 A I think we have, I think we've talked about 
25 that topic as far as we can really go with it. 
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1 We -- and then so now we've talked about 
2 cognitive issues. 
3 Q Behavioral issue? 
4 A We haven't talked about dementia. In other 
5 words, is there evidence that he is demented? And what 
6 I can tell you about that is simply that apparently 
7 Dr. Bigler and Weight thought his intellect was 
8 basically normal, so they did not find evidence of 
9 dementia as I understand it. 
10 Q What is the perspective risk of developing 
11 dementia or onset of dementia earlier because of a head 
12 injury of this kind? 
13 A Well, that's a very good question. And, 
14 again, I think it depends upon where you look. Again, 
15 if you look at injury clinics, you've got -- American 
16 injury clinics you have to be a little careful because 
17 they have a selective subpopulation and some other 
18 kinds of issues. But if you look sort of broadly, I 
19 think there is some literature supporting the idea that 
20 with enough injury you certainly can develop a 
21 dementing process. The place where that was originally 
22 discussed was in the punch drunk syndrome or the boxer 
23 syndrome or the pugilist syndrome which basically was 
24 the context of multiple small head injuries resulting 
25 in multiple disconnections and eventually in some 
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1 people a dementing process. 
2 Interestingly, that's certainly not everybody, 
3 it is only some. But it is in the literature, there's 
4 no question that that can occur. So it is possible for 
5 head injury to predispose to dementia, but how much a 
6 single head injury, even a single sizeable head injury 
7 predisposes to dementia is a much more complicated 
8 discussion and has much more tenuous footing. 
9 One of the places you can look at that 
10 question is the issue of stroke. In stroke we have 
11 very clear head injury. Now, it's a different type, 
12 and that's important, so we're not talking about the 
13 mechanical force type, we're talking about vascular 
14 type, so it's a different type, but there's no question 
15 there's a big injury in stroke, and so then the 
16 question comes up how many patients with stroke end up 
17 with dementia? And they can from multiple strokes, but 
18 they don't generally from a single stroke. 
19 Dementia is a term which may be used in 
20 various ways. If you use the term very broadly and you 
21 have a person who has stroke who has a speech problem, 
22 you could call that dementia, because you could call 
23 that a decrease in function that relates to 
24 intellectual function, but generally the term dementia 
25 is a more broader view of the ability to integrate and 
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1 process information, and that concept, that broader 
2 functionality concept, we don't see a lot of dementia 
3 following single strokes. We could, but we don't 
4 generally. We may after multiple strokes, such as 
5 occur in somebody who has cardiac emboli and that sort 
6 of thing. So the multiple stroke thing begins to look 
7 much more like a punch drunk syndrome, which 
8 interestingly is another example of multiple smaller 
9 injuries. 
10 So, is it possible for Nicholas to get 
11 dementia from his event? I think that's a discussion. 
12 I think my own opinion is that dementia from this event 
13 would not be highly probable. I don't think it's 
14 impossible, but it's not highly probable, and I think 
15 when we look at patients who had head injury and there 
16 is no secondary gain setting, late development of 
17 dementia doesn't seem to come out of that discussion. 
18 So I'm not excluding it, I'm simply saying it would be 
19 my opinion that this is probably not a likely outcome. 
20 Now, you mentioned earlier cerebral atrophy. 
21 I don't know what scans you may be referencing in 
22 bringing out that concept. If we actually have data 
23 demonstrating that he has cerebral atrophy, given his 
24 youth and given the fact that he had objective injury, 
25 I would then need to give more credence to the 
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1 possibility of him developing dementia from that event. 
2 So I've told you statistically a perspective, 
3 but if you actually could show me scans that have 
4 argued he has diffuse cerebral atrophy, I would 
5 certainly be willing to reconsider that point in his 
6 particular case. 
7 Q Fair enough. 
8 MR. ALDERMAN: Rich, can I interject here? 
9 Should we give a court a call? 
10 MR. HUMPHERYS: Do you mind if we take a 
11 break? 
12 THE WITNESS: Sure. 
13 (Break taken.) 
14 Q As I remember, we were talking about dementia 
15 and concluding our discussions about dementia. Do you 
16 have opinions as to other parts of what Nicholas is 
17 complaining of, either behaviorally or cognitively or 
18 whatever? 
19 A I think the disc problem that he had is 
20 related to the accident. 
21 Q You mentioned that. 
22 A Right, and do you want to talk about that any 
23 more or not? 
24 Q Well, let me just focus on the brain injury, 
25 if I could. Is there anything else about his 
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1 behavioral problems. You may have seen in the records 
2 he has a flat affect, that's consistent with a frontal 
3 lobe injury, isn't it? 
4 A That can be a frontal lobe injury, right. It 
5 can also be depression. As all of these things are, 
6 you have to try to see if you can determine what's the 
7 mechanism that generates the response. So if you think 
8 the mechanism that generates the flat affect is frontal 
9 lobe and the Fenius Gage discussion, okay, then there's 
10 that. And if you think the flat affect is due to 
11 depression, then there's a different set of mechanisms 
12 and a different set of treatment options. 
13 Q If the mechanism of the depression is -- has 
14 its origin in the brain injury, is the treatment any 
15 different than if the flat affect were simply a direct 
16 result of the injury to the frontal lobes? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q In what way? 
19 A Several. First, if the mechanism of 
20 depression is due to brain injury, then counselling is 
21 worthless because you're not talking about this being 
22 based in belief systems or value systems or experience. 
23 It's not going to get you anywhere. That's not the 
24 foundation of the problem. It's basically something 
25 you just approach pharmacologically. 
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1 You know, some degree of minor counselling 
2 could be useful simply at an adaptive level. In other 
3 words, how does a person get along in their life given 
4 that they've got a brain injury, but any kind of 
5 Freudian or behaviorist approach to going back to, you 
6 know, what you think might generate the depression is 
7 going to be a waste of time. This would be a 
8 biochemistry, it's not an experientially based 
9 phenomenon. 
10 On the other hand, if you think the depression 
11 is based on the anguish discussion and has an 
12 experiential foundation, then, as we know, we can help 
13 people by trying to re-orient the way they approach the 
14 world and the way they may be processing old 
15 information, and so the treatments are quit different 
16 at that level. 
17 Also, medication wise, if we think that the 
18 disorder is purely structural and frontal lobe 
19 generated, then medications that activate frontal lobe 
20 functions may be more beneficial, Effexor, for example, 
21 being one example or possibly Wellbutrin might be more 
22 useful whereas *serotonergic drugs that have more to do 
23 with downward descending pathways and limbic system may 
24 be less useful, so the pharmacology changes some. 
25 Also, in regard to prognosis, if you believe 
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1 that the mechanism of the depression is a residual of 
2 old brain injury, then the prognosis is the patient 
3 will have a permanent disorder to whatever extent that 
4 nature does not fix the injury, and by this time nature 
5 will have done what it can with regard to his injury. 
6 Q As good as it's going to get. 
7 A As good as it's going to get, yes. So if you 
8 believe that the mechanism of the depression is 
9 structural from his injury, then you're talking about a 
10 permanent problem and the whole treatment strategy 
11 becomes living with permanent residuals. If you 
12 believe that the mechanism of his depression has a lot 
13 to do with experience and behaviorally based 
14 depression, then he may be much more curable because it 
15 may be that he could get, you know, change in view of 
16 early experiences or prior experiences or value systems 
17 or belief systems and those could lead to, then, much 
18 better outcome in his overall function and capacities. 
19 Q I f i t i s a combination of the two, which it 
2 0 very well may likely be, then I guess you have that 
21 problem of the structural part never resolving, but the 
22 behavioral or experiential part improving or not 
23 improving depending upon how the structural part 
24 effects them? 
25 A Or depending upon how a person can modify 
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1 their --
2 Q Adapt? 
3 A Adapt in their foundations for behavior. You 
4 know, this is difficult stuff and we don't have crystal 
5 balls so we can't delineate entirely how it's 
6 segregated, but the importance for this young man is 
7 here he is in the early part of his life and you want 
8 to give him his life back as much as you can. So as 
9 best we can, we want to try and figure this out because 
10 then we can determine what we possibly are able to do. 
11 Q And therapy, at least to the extent that it's 
12 behavioral or experiential, as well as adaptive in 
13 nature, can help him give back as much life as 
14 possible, if I understand what you're saying? 
15 A Well, no. I think cognitive therapy is going 
16 to be fairly useless if you believe it to be a 
17 structurally based disorder. You can do some simple 
18 things. You can do some things like saying, Well, 
19 okay, here you are, you have this permanent problem, 
2 0 how are you going to manage your life with it? But you 
21 can do some fairly simple things only. Let me jump 
22 outside the brain for a second. If a person had a leg 
23 dysfunction, a leg paralysis and it was due to a 
24 stroke, you might give that person some brief 
25 counselling to say, Well, your leg is permanently 
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1 paralyzed, but here's -- let me help you a little bit 
2 with the emotions, but mostly you are not going to 
3 spend a lot of time on counselling for that sort of 
4 thing, that's simply adapt and move on. 
5 On the other hand, if the person's paralysis 
6 was hysterical, then counselling may do a lot for the 
7 underlying mechanism of the problem, possibly even to 
8 the point of returning the person to function. 
9 So I think if you believe that his disorder is 
10 mostly structural injury, then counselling is going to 
11 be more or less a waste of money, more or less. Brief 
12 counselling, to the extent of simply giving him some 
13 adaptive skills, here's how you move on with your life 
14 given these residuals could be useful, but it's going 
15 to be fairly brief. And long-term counselling is 
16 probably not only going to be not helpful, but may 
17 actually entrench him in endless behavior and may 
18 encourage propagation of the problem. So if you really 
19 believe that most of this is due to structural injury, 
20 I would not suggest a long-term counselling session. I 
21 think most of it you're going to do is going to be 
22 pharmacological. 
23 Q Now, before we leave the head injury side, I 
24 would like to ask you, you've raised a lot of issues 
25 which are certainly appropriate issues to query, but 
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1 what I want to know is, have you reached any opinions 
2 about Nicholas Sorensen, in your judgment, has the 
3 traumatic brain injury resulted in an aggravation of or 
4 cause of any of these behavioral or emotional problems 
5 you've referred to? 
6 A My opinion at this time based on the data that 
7 I have is that his behavioral state is probably more to 
8 do with underlying, you know, depression and issues 
9 than it is with injury, that's my opinion at this time. 
10 And we've talked about the various ways that opinion 
11 could shift based on data, and we've talked about 
12 variations, but that's my bottom line. 
13 My opinion is that I'm not sure whether he has 
14 a seizure disorder or not because subsequent EEGs have 
15 failed to reveal it and his response to therapy 
16 apparently has been poor. 
17 My opinion is that he clearly did have an 
18 injury and that there probably are some residuals, but 
19 I think other issues are compounding those residuals as 
2 0 I just mentioned. 
21 And then we have not spent time on the disc 
22 problem, I'll just leave those, but that's also in 
23 there. 
24 Q Now, you mentioned it two or three times about 
25 the disc being related to the accident. Is there 
61 
1 anything more that we need to talk about? 
2 A No. I mean --
3 Q You're report's fairly clear on that. 
4 A I think it is. I think we don't know of any 
5 underlying problem where he had that. We know that 
6 this injury was big enough that certainly we could 
7 expect he could have had a disc injury and, you know, 
8 he was young enough that you would not expect this to 
9 be incidental, so I think it's related. 
10 Q Any other opinions you have relating to 
11 Nicholas Sorensen? 
12 A Yes, I have the opinion that we should 
13 struggle hard to try to determine some of these areas 
14 that are vague to us for him because it's his life and, 
15 you know, we've got to try to figure this out as best 
16 we can. So if you can get the stuff at the university 
17 and if they can give us further information, that may 
18 be very helpful. 
19 Q Okay. Anything else? 
2 0 A No. 
21 Q All right. I would like to ask you about some 
22 additional questions now that we have your opinions, 
23 hopefully, described in great detail. Let me make sure 
24 I reassemble these exhibits properly. 
25 On Exhibit 2 -- do you have that in front of 
62 
1 you? 
2 MR. ALDERMAN: Right here. 
3 Q There are two Post-its that appear on this, 
4 and for whatever reason, I don't know, we didn't get 
5 those Post-its at the beginning when we had requested 
6 the records. This -- or do you know where this came 
7 from, these Post-its, whose they were? 
8 A Yes. Those were, I think, his. I mean I don't 
9 know who came to the window, but what I think happened 
10 with this is that I sent the letter of 9/15 to him, I 
11 think, I think that's where he got it. And then I 
12 think what happened is he or somebody came to the 
13 window and said he wanted one of the sentences removed, 
14 which was the sentence about the depression and that 
15 being present prior to the accident and the -- this was 
16 written by the secretary, these two little Post-it 
17 notes. The -- there's a phone number there that says 
18 Nick and then it gives a phone number, which I'm 
19 gathering is his phone number. 
20 So I would presume he came to the window and 
21 said I would like that sentence removed. I don't know 
22 if he came to the window, but that's what I'm 
23 presuming. 
24 Q And help me find that sentence. I'm not --
25 A It's in the copy that you have -- well, you 
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1 may have two copies. But in the copy that shows the 
2 Post-it notes, it's underneath the Post-it notes, so 
3 it's --
4 Q There it is, "Nick has done generally well 
5 although he has had continuing depression, which is a 
6 problem present prior to the accident." And he's 
7 saying that he had depression in 10th grade. Do you 
8 know what that surrounded, what situation that was 
9 relating to? 
10 A No, and I don't know if that was the gang 
11 thing or not. 
12 Q But in any event, we have his note to you that 
13 he had a depressive episode in 10th grade or sometime 
14 prior --
15 A Right. 
16 Q --a year or more, a year or two prior, and 
17 you recall the issue regarding the gang jumping him? 
18 A That's in the -- my original report. Again, 
19 it's something he told me. 
20 Q Yes. 
21 A But, again, now, was that gang jumping event 
22 the event that's referenced here in the 10th grade, I 
23 don't know. 
24 Q Now, let me see if I can clarify a few things. 
25 In Exhibit 2, it appears that your first contact with 
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1 Dunn & Dunn was a letter in May -- I believe May 14 --
2 wherein a subpoena was enclosed ot appear at trial 
3 together with a check of $18.50 as an appearance fee. 
4 Do you see that in Exhibit 2? 
5 A Yes, I think so. I've seen the letter of 
6 May 14th, and then I'm seeing that $18.50 check, yes. 
7 Q And the subpoena just behind it? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Prior to this time, had you had any direct 
10 contact with Dunn & Dunn to your knowledge? 
11 A If there's no other letters, then the answer 
12 would be no. 
13 Q I don't know of any, but I don't know of any 
14 oral communication either, so I'm inquiring --
15 A I don't think there was any. I don't know if 
16 anybody called. I don't think anybody called. I think 
17 that's when it started. 
18 Q Then we have a letter which is closer to the 
19 top of Exhibit 2 dated May 23, again from Dunn & Dunn, 
20 and it's in response to your letter of May 23rd where 
21 you indicate that you normally charge $315 an hour and 
22 that you didn't want to presume anything but assumed 
23 that they would pay and you wanted that confirmed. Is 
24 that kind of a fair synopsis? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q The May 23rd response back, which is the same 
2 day, I assume these were faxed back and forth, it 
3 indicates -- Ms. Hanson indicates, "Of course we plan 
4 to pay you at your rate of $315 per hour for your 
5 appearance." And then it says, "In fact, we wonder if 
6 you would be willing to spend several hours, 
7 approximately five, and review all of Nicholas Sorensen 
8 records. We would like to know what you think, as his 
9 treating physician early on in his injury, about his 
10 current condition. Let us know and we will see if our 
11 client will authorize something like that." 
12 Now, at this point in time you understood that 
13 Dunn & Dunn was representing Marcelises, correct? 
14 A Yes, I don't know that -- yes, I presume that 
15 is the case. I'm not interested in that particularly, 
16 so with regard to somebody, if you would have asked or 
17 if they would have asked, I was more interested in 
18 somebody simply asking for my opinion. But I believe 
19 that that is correct, that that is who they represent, 
20 yes. 
21 Q Then in the page immediately before on 
22 Exhibit 2 is another letter or a memo dated 5/23/03 
23 where you are responding apparently and saying that you 
24 would be happy to review the rest of his records and 
25 include this in your overall assessment of his illness. 
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1 And then you indicated, "It's always a pleasure to see 
2 the rest of the story." 
3 What was your understanding -- was there any 
4 information provided to you orally in conversations 
5 during this period of time? 
6 A I don't know. I certainly have no 
7 recollection if there was some sort of discussion on 
8 the phone or not, I don't know. So all I know is that 
9 their office contacted my office with these things as 
10 you see here to basically ask me to evaluate this 
11 patient•s records and then talk about my opinion 
12 regarding him. With regard to -- was there some phone 
13 conversation, I don't know if there was a phone 
14 conversation. 
15 With regard to the rest of the story, that's 
16 probably a reference to the letter of May 23rd where 
17 it's asked if I would look through the rest of the 
18 records, and I put that in there because, you know, we 
19 get these snippets of people's lives when we get to see 
20 them, and part of the thing that's very revealing is 
21 what happens later, how does it play out. And so 
22 finding out what happens afterward is very interesting 
23 and useful, so I probably was going, yes, I would be 
24 happy to know what happened. 
25 Q So the fact that that was said doesn't mean 
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1 that there was conversations between the two of you or 
2 someone else at Dunn & Dunn? 
3 A No. That was probably a reference to them 
4 asking me to review the records. 
5 Q Then next we have is Exhibit 3. That is a 
6 letter from Dunn & Dunn dated August 1st, 2003 
7 addressed to you and it starts out by saying, "Enclosed 
8 please find copies of Nicholas Sorensen's medical 
9 records in the above referenced matter. You treated 
10 Mr. Sorensen following an automobile accident on 
11 July 24, 1999. We would like you to review his medical 
12 records and give us your opinions about a couple of 
13 things. The following is some information about what 
14 has been going on with Mr. Sorensen since you last saw 
15 him," and she then provides some additional information 
16 there. 
17 On your copy it has highlighted the words "we 
18 would like you to review his medical records and give 
19 us your opinion." Tell me why that was highlighted, do 
20 you know? 
21 A I don't know who did that. I don't know if 
22 the secretary did it or what. I don't really know 
23 where that came from, whether that was there when we 
24 got it or whether it was something that my secretary 
25 added, it could be either. 
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1 Q Was this the only communication you had had 
2 prior to those correspondences which we just reviewed 
3 in May up until this time? 
4 A Well, again, I don't recall if there were any 
5 phone calls or discussions. I don't know. So what I 
6 know about is simply what it talks about in these 
7 letters. My understanding of it was -- and basic 
8 overview that I had seen this patient, he then had gone 
9 on to other people, you guys have this litigation, they 
10 had, then, looked at my opinions, they had, then, asked 
11 me to review the rest of his records and tell them what 
12 my opinion was based on the original stuff and also my 
13 subsequent review of the records. That's my basic 
14 understanding of the situation. 
15 Q In the fourth full paragraph she asks you --
16 well, let's see. She's asking you I guess --or she's 
17 presenting the issues she wants you to address; is that 
18 correct? "The question we have is to what degree his 
19 current issues are as a result of the injury and what 
20 those issues might be as a result of problems 
21 Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident." 
22 A Yes, I think that was the basic overview of 
23 the question they had. 
24 Q Now, the last paragraph -- well, let me back 
25 up. This is fairly consistent with when you were 
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1 retained to do IMEs on a cold file review except you've 
2 had a little history in treatment years before. 
3 Let me rephrase that. What she•s asking you 
4 to do is fairly consistent with a cold file review, 
5 correct, that is, she's sending you records, look at 
6 this and --
7 A Tell us what you think. 
8 Q tell us the issues? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Now, in the last --on page 2 of Exhibit 3, 
11 the first paragraph says, "After you have a chance to 
12 review his records, give me a call so we can discuss 
13 your opinions about Mr. Sorensen's progress over the 
14 last several years. There are several issues we would 
15 like you to address but we can talk about those when 
16 you call. " 
17 Did you respond to that request? 
18 A Probably did. Yes, I did call, and that's why 
19 I didn't send this report that I have here, is I did 
20 call and talk to them. 
21 Q In your discussion with them --do you know 
22 who it was you talked with when you made the call? Was 
23 it an attorney, was it Ms. Hanson, was it a group of 
24 people or do you remember? 
25 THE WITNESS: I think we talked, didn't we 
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1 talk? Did we talk? 
2 I don't know for sure whether I talked to Kay 
3 at that point or whether -- who I talked to at that 
4 time. I don't know for sure. 
5 Q Anyway, it was someone from Dunn & Dunn? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And had you prepared your report at that time? 
8 A Let's see, what's the date? No. 
9 Q August 11? 
10 A No, because this was -- well, actually, let's 
11 see, I probably did. Yes, I probably had done that 
12 because this, as I said, I did concurrently when going 
13 through the records. So what would happened is I would 
14 have gone through the records, made all of my notes, 
15 made my conclusions so I understood what I was 
16 thinking, and then I would have called up and said 
17 here's what I'm thinking. 
18 Q All right. And then talking with someone at 
19 Dunn & Dunn's office you went through the various 
20 opinions in your report, correct? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q And then were you going to send that to Dunn & 
23 Dunn? 
24 A I think they asked me not to at the time. 
25 Q Do you know why? 
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1 A No. Some sort of legal issue I guess. 
2 Q Did they ever suggest that they did not want 
3 to refer to you as an expert or a defense expert? 
4 A I don't know. They may have, I don't know. 
5 Q And then after preparing that report, 
6 reviewing it with Dunn & Dunn, what was your next 
7 involvement in this case, if you remember? 
8 A Well, look at that billing thing. Let's see 
9 what the billing thing says. 
10 Q That's Exhibit 4. 
11 A So let me see the date here --so the next 
12 thing was, then, the meeting that Mr. Alderman and I 
13 had on the 16th. 
14 Q Of? 
15 A Of September, where he came to talk about my 
16 opinions. 
17 Q Is this the first face-to-face meeting you had 
18 had with anyone from Dunn & Dunn? 
19 A I believe it was. 
2 0 Q And are we talking about a half an hour to an 
21 hour? 
22 A That was two hours, it looks like. It would 
23 have been -- well, it's whatever $351 into $787 is, 
24 that's probably like two and a half hours or something 
25 like that, and it probably would have included the time 
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1 I prepared for the thing, which is probably, I don't 
2 know, an hour, 45 minutes, something or other and 
3 whatever time we met. So I don't know exactly what the 
4 time break down is, but it would have been something 
5 like that. 
6 Q Any further communications until our office 
7 contacted you to meet last Thursday? 
8 A No, I don't think so -- well, wait a minute. 
9 That's not true probably. I probably called him to 
10 tell him that you were coming because you guys have all 
11 of your legal stuff and I'm trying to be very delicate 
12 with that stuff, so... 
13 Q So the record's clear, the pronouns you're 
14 using, when we contacted you to meet with you, you 
15 called Mr. Alderman to tell him that I was going to 
16 meet with you? 
17 A That you were coming, yes. 
18 Q I see. Was there any further discussion 
19 regarding that? 
20 A No, I think I just told him that you were 
21 coming and that was it. 
22 Q In your meeting of September 16, did you 
23 provide Mr. Alderman with a copy of the report or did 
24 you show it to him, allow him to read it? 
25 A I don't know if I did that. I actually may 
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1 not have because I think I gave -- I know I didn't give 
2 him a copy of it because I think I gave him a copy 
3 today when I gave you a copy. So that's the first time 
4 I think hef s seen a copy? 
5 THE WITNESS: Is that correct? I think that's 
6 correct. 
7 MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. 
8 Q In any event, you discussed the substance of 
9 that? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Now, when I met with you last week, I believe 
12 that you indicated -- and when I asked if you had 
13 prepared anything, you said you had prepared a report, 
14 you referred to it, but when I asked to see it, I think 
15 you indicated you thought it would be attorney work 
16 product or something such as that. 
17 A Well, it could be. I didn't know how you guys 
18 would handle that issue. In other words, you have your 
19 own sets of terminology and your own sets of rules and 
2 0 I'm not familiar with all of those rules, and I have 
21 had one very unfortunate experience, which you probably 
22 know about, that has to do with one of these things 
23 where there was some nuance I did not understand and 
24 that created problems. So I try to be very careful 
25 with that, therefore, I was not sure if I could give 
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1 you that copy or not. And since I was not sure, I told 
2 you that I would wait for you guys to talk to each 
3 other to determine whether I could give it to you or 
4 not. 
5 Q Right. I think you indicated I needed 
6 permission --or that you needed permission from 
7 Mr. Dunn's office to produce it to me? 
8 A Right. 
9 Q Now, at any time, Dr. Barbuto, did you have a 
10 release signed by Mr. Sorensen that would allow you to 
11 talk with anyone other than Mr. Sorensen or his 
12 representatives? 
13 A I believe we had this --we had all of those 
14 things when they come, the -- whatever that is. 
15 Q I've seen some releases, but I didn't see 
16 anything that would release information to Dunn & Dunn. 
17 A They -- I think they said they subpoenaed me 
18 to testify at trial and talk with them -- yes, that was 
19 back in May. 
2 0 Q But was -- are you referring only to the 
21 subpoena to appear at trial? 
22 A Well, my understanding was that will -- that 
23 allows me to talk to him, that's my understanding. You 
24 know, whether it actually says you can have a meeting 
25 or not, I don't know about that. But my understanding 
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1 was I was told that I was going to -- the court was 
2 defining that I should participate in this and that, 
3 therefore, I can talk with them. 
4 Q Is that what Dunn & Dunn indicated to you or 
5 is that something you assumed on your own? 
6 A Well, other times when we've had these --
7 we've had these, you know, subpoenas, they basically 
8 mean that I am now expected to talk with people 
9 involved in the situation, and it then means that the 
10 situation's outside of the normal, you know, patient 
11 confidentiality stuff because it's now a legal 
12 proceeding and I'm involved in that, so, therefore, I'm 
13 to talk to the involved people, so that's my 
14 understanding. 
15 Q Now, the first subpoena I found in your record 
16 had you to appear on June 5th. Now, you had 
17 communicated through correspondence otherwise regarding 
18 Ms. Hanson's request and then furthermore in August and 
19 in September. Are you familiar with the *HIPPA law? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Do you find anywhere in your file a HIPPA 
22 release that was signed by Mr. Sorensen or his legal 
23 representative? I have not seen it, but I would love 
24 to see if you might have it and I just haven't seen it. 
25 A Well, I'm not seeing something that says 
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1 specifically the HIPPA thing. I am seeing the subpoena 
2 to testify at trial, which as I'm understanding, once 
3 you get into that, you're outside the HIPPA situation 
4 anyway. It's not -- because you're now in a trial 
5 situation and consequently -- as I understand it, that 
6 takes you outside of that. 
7 Q Even for ex parte contacts with opposing 
8 counsel with no notice given to plaintiffs? 
9 A I don't know the nuances of your rules. My 
10 understanding of it is that when we are involved in 
11 legal work, when somebody says to us that you are 
12 involve in this, that that's now outside of the HIPPA 
13 restrictions. In other words, you don't go to the 
14 patient and say, Can I talk to this person? That isn't 
15 the way it works as I understand it. 
16 Q Is it your understanding, then, that if a 
17 member of the media came and asked you about 
18 Mr. Sorensen that once receiving a subpoena that you 
19 could talk to the media about his personal life? 
20 A Well, I think the media is much different. 
21 The legal world involves us, just as you guys have, in 
22 these proceedings and it's my understanding that when 
23 we are involved in this, when we are demanded to 
24 participate in it or asked to participate in it and we 
25 have been, you know, duly asked to participate in it, 
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1 that that's not in the legal -- that's not the HIPPA --
2 it's not in the HIPPA realm, it's outside of HIPPA 
3 which has to do with normal patient care and that sort 
4 of thing. 
5 Now, if you go to the media, the media is not 
6 a legal entity and it's not a legal -- it's not the 
7 lawyers and the legal setting, so it's a different 
8 situation as far as I understand it. 
9 Q And as far as you understand that you can talk 
10 once a subpoena has been issued, you can talk --do you 
11 know what ex parte means? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Ex parte means that you can talk with someone 
14 without giving anyone else that's interested notice or 
15 knowledge that this conversation is taking place. 
16 A Okay. I don't know about that. I mean that's 
17 your --
18 Q Is it your understanding, then, that once a 
19 subpoena has been issued to testify at trial, such as 
20 here, that you appear and give testimony on June 5th, 
21 that that would give you a carte blanche justification 
22 to talk with opposing counsel about your patient with 
23 no notice given at all to your patient? 
24 A Yes, that's my understanding. 
25 Q Have you done this before in the past where 
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1 you have gone ahead and had ex parte communications, as 
2 I've defined ex parte, with defense counsel when you 
3 have had patients either treating -- well, I guess it 
4 would have to be in a treating situation? 
5 A Well, there are certainly patients where we 
6 get -- I mean, I see patients in my practice where we 
7 get involved in some aspect like this, you have a legal 
8 confrontation and it has to do with that patient. We 
9 get subpoenas for records all the time, that's almost a 
10 daily thing. So as I'm understanding it, when you 
11 have -- when you guys in the legal community define 
12 that we have to give this stuff, then that's --we are 
13 supposed to do.that. I'm not aware that there are some 
14 sort of nuances where you can do it this way but not 
15 that way. I'm not aware of that. 
16 So in patients who have been clinical 
17 patients, there have been times when I have been asked 
18 by attorneys or somebody to talk about the patient as 
19 part of a legal process. As I understand it --
20 Q Even if it's the opposed attorneys? 
21 A As I understand it, when you guys do your 
22 legal work and you put these issues at issue in the 
23 legal arena, you then, by that process, take the 
24 patient's privacy issue out of the privacy issue. In 
25 other words, you are now saying this is a discussion 
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1 which will take place in court and it is a discussion 
2 or in the legal arena and information now goes outside 
3 of the normal doctor-patient relationship. 
4 So my understanding of it is that when you 
5 guys get involved and do this, it now no longer is 
6 restrained in the normal doctor-patient relationship 
7 and normal, you know, communication limitations. And 
8 as I understand it, it just -- just the patient's 
9 choice to be involved in the legal process and to do 
10 this is what basically then opens them up for this. In 
11 other words, the patient chooses to make this a social 
12 issue where information is being -- going to be handled 
13 by legal authorities, courts, attorneys, other kinds of 
14 things. And as I understand it, when the patient does 
15 that, they, then, have basically defined that they're 
16 allowing their information to be processed by this 
17 system and it is not -- it is not in the normal patient 
18 confidentiality realm any longer. 
19 Q Bu that's --
2 0 A And I think you do have to be -- in other 
21 words, when you have information like this, it's not 
22 something where that suddenly gives you the right to 
23 talk to everybody on the planet, but the involved 
24 people, I understand, you can talk to. 
25 Q With no notice to your patient? 
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1 A Yes, t h a t i s my unders tanding , y e s . That i s 
2 correct. 
3 Q Do you recall being involved in a case 
4 involving Balyura? 
5 A Yes, that's the case that I've referenced that 
6 was so ugly. 
7 Q Where you were involved on behalf of the 
8 patient and then had an ex parte discussion with 
9 defense counsel, Joe Joyce. 
10 A I recall that case very well and very 
11 unfortunately, yes. You know the details of that one. 
12 Q And do you recall being -- meeting with Piero 
13 Ruffinengo? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And that — did you not understand after that 
16 that it is inappropriate to talk to opposing counsel 
17 without proper notice? 
18 A No, I didn't understand that. What I 
19 understood was this: First of all, as I understood the 
20 case with that particular case, as you know, this was a 
21 very unpleasant and very unfortunate situation. It was 
22 basically the situation where my brother-in-law, Joe 
23 Steele had asked me to see this patient, but then asked 
24 me to treat the patient and become a treating doctor, 
25 not an expert, but rather a treating doctor. So as I 
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1 understood it, I was a treating doctor not Joe's 
2 expert, and as I understood that, when Mr. Joyce became 
3 involved as the other attorney and told me that as the 
4 other attorney he had right to the information and 
5 right to talk to me --
6 Q Without notice? 
7 A Of the patient? 
8 Q To the patient, without notice to the patient, 
9 he had a right to talk to you? 
10 A Yes, that was my understanding, is that he had 
11 a right -- because of your legal arena, that he had a 
12 right to talk to me about this patient because it was a 
13 legal confrontation and he was involved in it, and so 
14 when he came and actually was talking about another 
15 case where I was seeing the -- for which I was an 
16 expert in that case, he said, you know, Can I talk with 
17 you about this case? And I said, Well, is that 
18 appropriate, are you the attorney involved and is that 
19 appropriate to do that? And as I understand, he said 
2 0 yes, he told me that that was appropriate and I could 
21 talk with him. 
22 So my understanding was in that situation that 
23 this was a discussion of being involved with attorneys 
24 who are trying to work out the case and who -- and 
25 because it's a legal arena, you can talk with them. 
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1 Now, the -- that particular case, I think Joe felt that 
2 I was his expert, I think was the issue, but the 
3 trouble is he didn't define it as such and I had 
4 actually been treating the patient. 
5 So as far as I knew, I could not wear both 
6 hats, I could not be treating patient at the time --
7 actively treating the patient and at the same time wear 
8 the other hat. So as I understood it, that at that 
9 time, you know, I wasn't -- I was the treating doctor 
10 and this attorney was involved in the case and the case 
11 was before the courts, and consequently because it was 
12 before the courts, I was allowed to talk with the 
13 involved people and so, therefore, I was doing that, 
14 that was my understanding of how it worked. 
15 MR. HUMPHERYS: I have no further questions. 
16 MR. ALDERMAN: I just have one quick follow-up 
17 question. 
18 EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. ALDERMAN: 
20 Q Mr. Humpherys stated earlier -- and I believe 
21 he was trying to -- or he was quoting from your meeting 
22 that you had with him last Thursday, and he said that 
23 you had told him that you needed permission from Dunn & 
24 Dunn to give him this report dated 8/11/03. Do you 
25 remember that testimony? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Did anyone from Dunn & Dunn tell you that you 
3 needed permission to give that report to Mr. Humpherys? 
4 A No, I am simply trying to be sure that what I 
5 am doing is appropriate because of that Balyura case. 
6 That was a very, very ugly situation and, you know, I'm 
7 trying to ever avoid having that kind of thing 
8 repeated. So consequently, I'm trying to determine 
9 what are your rules and how do we participate with 
10 these rules and, therefore, since I was not sure what 
11 the rules were and how it could be done, I said I 
12 needed to find out from you guys or have the two of you 
13 talk so that I could know what was appropriate to do. 
14 MR. ALDERMAN: I have no further questions. 
15 THE WITNESS: Can I ask a question? 
16 MR. HUMPHERYS: We can go off the record. 
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